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Nevertheless, judicial support for arbitration has been tempered during the last
two centuries by due process limitations. This finding addresses a major
concern for arbitration critics who perceive current courts as too permissive in
enforcing one-sided arbitration agreements. Post-Gilmer and Circuit City
courts have denied enforcement with surprisingfrequency, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's strong and clear message to avoid interfering with these
arrangements. These courts are recreating many of the due process safeguards
from nineteenth century courts.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................... 252
A. Overview of Mandatory Arbitration .............................................. 252
B. Organization of This Article .......................................................... 257
II. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE ENACTMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT (USAA) ....................................... 259
A. Early Common Law Doctrines That Regulated Predispute
Arbitration Agreem ents ................................................................. 259
B. Common Law Regulation of Individual Employment
A rbitration ................................................................................... 269
C. The Fallacy That Common Law Doctrines Were Hostile to
A rbitration ..................................................................................... 272
III. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND PREDISPUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS ................................................................ 277
IV . RESEARCH M ETHODS ........................................................................... 289
V. RESEARCH FINDINGS: COMPARISON OF PRE-GILMER, POST-GILMER,
AND POST-CIRCUIT CITY DECISIONS ..................................................... 296
A. At the district court level, the lowest rate ofjudicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements occurred before Gilmer ... 297
B. District court enforcement of arbitration agreements substantially
increased in the post-Gilmer period, but appellate court
enforcement dropped sharply ........................................................ 298
C. District court enforcement of arbitration agreements remained
unchanged following Circuit City, while the appellate court
enforcement rate rose sharply ...................................................... 298
D. Enforcement of arbitration agreements varied widely by federal
circuits after Gilmer, without exhibiting a geographic pattern ..... 299
[Vol. 18:2 20031
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
C H A R T 1 ...................................................................................................... 299
C H A RT 2 ...................................................................................................... 300
T A B LE 1 ...................................................................................................... 30 1
T A B LE 2 ...................................................................................................... 302
VI. RESEARCH FINDINGS: COMPARISON OF DECISIONS
THAT DENY ARBITRATION BY LEGAL ISSUE ....................................... 302
A. The two most effective employee issues prior to Gilmer-
mandatory agreements as adhesion contracts and precluded
statutory enforcement of rights-declined in effectiveness after
Gilm er, but remained potent .......................................................... 303
B. The post-Gilmer period marked the emergence of successful
contract-formation and due process challenges ............................ 303
C. After Gilmer, employees were moderately successful in
persuading courts that their arbitration agreement was
excluded under Section 1 of the FAA ..... : ...................................... 307
D. Following Circuit City, three employee challenges to arbitration
remained effective-whether a contract was formed, or a
statute precluded arbitration, or forum costs were improperly
shifted to an individual-while FAA exclusion challenges lost
m uch of their potency ..................................................................... 308
E. After Circuit City, new procedural issues shortened filing limits,
unavailability of class actions, and forum inconvenience-
emerged as effective employee challenges to arbitration
agreem ents ..................................................................................... 309
T A B LE A ..................................................................................................... 3 10
T A B LE B ..................................................................................................... 3 12
V II. C ONCLUSION S ............................................................................... 313
APPENDIX I: FEDERAL DECISIONS INVOLVING CHALLENGES TO
MANDATORY EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION ............................................. 331
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The mode of settling controversies by arbitration has in modem times become
peculiary the favorite of the law, and the ancient niceties and technicalities
applied to it have given way to a more rational and liberal construction, with a
view to encourage and sustain this mode ofputting an end to litigation. Hence
it is that many of the more ancient adjudications upon this subject are found
not to be good authority.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview of Mandatory Employment Arbitration
The substitution of mandatory arbitration for discrimination lawsuits is the
most significant employment law development since the early 1990s. Critics
charge that employers control too much of this private dispute resolution
system. 2 This complaint ignores the fact that the court system functions poorly
for employment discrimination plaintiffs. 3
Employers want unlimited access to arbitration. This dispute resolution
process protects them from expensive liability. 4 It is private5 and shields their
documents from discovery. 6 In addition, arbitration is faster and more
I Shockey's Adm'r v. Glasford, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 10, 11 (1837), quoted by Adams'
Adm'r v. Ringo, 79 Ky. 211, 219 (Ky. App. 1880) (emphasis added).
2 See infra note 210.
3 See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims ofEmployment Discrimination, 50 Disp.
RES. J. 40, 44 (Oct.-Dec. 1995) (reporting percentage of employment complaints that are
accepted by attorneys), and Susan K. Gauvey, ADR's Integration in the Federal Court
System, 34 MD. B. J. 36, 41 (2001) (reporting percentage of complaints that go to trial).
4 See Arbitration: Attorney Urges Employers to Adopt Mandatory Programs as Risk-
Management, DAILY LAB. REPT, May 14, 2001, No. 93 (reporting an employment lawyer's
view that mandatory arbitration helps employers limit damages and eliminate class action
lawsuits. David Copus also notes that the biggest financial risk for employers in termination
lawsuits- tort claims in which a single plaintiff can be awarded millions of dollars- is
controlled by arbitration agreements that cap damages).
5 See Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, 1997 WL 33159163 (E.E.O.C.
Guidance July 10, 1997), concluding that "because [arbitration] decisions are private, there is
little, if any, public accountability even for employers who have been determined to have
violated the law. The lack of public disclosure not only weakens deterrence ... but also
prevents assessment of whether practices of individual employers or particular industries are
in need of reform."
6 See id. (stating that "[d]iscovery is significantly limited compared with that available
in court and permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure").
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economical than trials.7 By unilaterally selecting arbitrators, employers improve
their odds of defeating discrimination claims.8 They also require employees to
pay a significant portion of forum costs associated with private judging.9
Much of this is potentially bad news for employees. They are often denied
attorneys' fees when they prevail on discrimination claims in arbitration' 0 and
must agree to limits on remedies. I I Individuals are disadvantaged when they are
shut out of the process for selecting an arbitrator. 12 Nevertheless, they have little
choice but to go along with all of this because they risk termination if they
resist. 13
For decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has approved various uses of
7 See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 552 (4th Cir.
2001) ("'the arbitration of disputes enables parties to avoid the costs associated with pursuing
a judicial resolution of their grievances. By one estimate, litigating a typical employment
dispute costs at least $50,000 and takes two and one-half years to resolve."' (quoting Hooters
of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999))).
8 See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights 'Waived' and
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. EMP. L.J. 381, Spring 1996, at 428
("[S]tatutory discrimination grievances relegated to... arbitration forums are virtually
assured employer-favored outcomes," given "the manner of selecting, controlling, and
compensating arbitrators, the privacy of the process and how it catalytically arouses an
arbitrator's desire to be acceptable to one side"); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players,
Adhesion Contracts, and the Use of Statistics on Judicial Review of EmploymentArbitration
Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 223, 258-59 (1998).
9 E.g., LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 2 (D.D.C. 2000)
(employee was assessed $8376 for NASD forum fees).
1o See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1 st
Cir. 1999) (rejecting an employee's argument that because arbitrators often refuse to award
statutory attorneys' fees, NYSE arbitration procedures were inadequate for Title VII claims).
I I Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (although
Title VII permits up to $300,000 in punitive damages, court upheld $162,000 limit imposed
by arbitration agreement).
12 See Hooters ofAmerica, 173 F.3d at 938 (concluding that the employer's rules, which
included unilateral selection of the arbitrator, were "so egregiously unfair as to constitute a
complete default of its contractual obligation to draft arbitration rules and to do so in good
faith," and finding that the only possible purpose of these rules was "to undermine the
neutrality of the proceeding"). Compare this ruling with empirical research of employment
arbitration systems in Mei Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 Disp.
RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 8 (survey of 80 employers using predispute arbitration agreements
showed that about 15 percent provided for unilateral selection by the employer).
13 See Jones v. Fujitsu Network Communications, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 688, 692 (N.D.
Tex. 1999) (quoting at length from company president's memo stating that "[p]articipation in
this (arbitration) program (is) mandatory for all employees-continuing and new, full time
and part time, regular and temporary-and is a condition of employment").
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arbitration. 14 This includes the workplace dispute resolution process known as
voluntary labor arbitration, adopted by unions and employers in collective
bargaining agreements.' 5 Much more recently, the Court approved arbitration
systems that employers imposed on their workers in Gilmer v. 'Interstate!
Johnson Lane Corp. (hereafter Gilmer), 16 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
(hereafter Circuit City). 17 This dispute resolution process is called mandatory
employment arbitration because individuals are compelled to agree to arbitrate,
rather than litigate, claims that arise from the employment relationship. 18
This Article examines current trends in judicial enforcement of mandatory
employment arbitration agreements. It presents original empirical research of
396 federal court decisions from 1954-2002. Nearly all of these cases involved
employee attempts to sue their employers, while at the same time their
employers sought a court order to refer the dispute to arbitration.' 9 This
empirical approach compares judicial treatment of employment arbitration over
three critical periods in the current evolution of this ADR method. 20 We find
that courts do not automatically enforce predispute employment arbitration
agreements, even though Gilmer and Circuit City give the clear impression that
federal courts should strongly support this process.
Our investigation begins before the contemporary period. This long-term
view provides perspective for assessing current regulation of employment
14 E.g., Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Rodrigues de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flodd & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350
U.S. 198 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
15 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Collectively, the first three cases are
known as the Steelworkers Trilogy.
16 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
17 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
18 E.g., Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 1999)
(offer of employment was rescinded after successful job applicant refused to sign mandatory
employment arbitration agreement).
19 On rare occasions, a role-reversal occurs in which an employer sues, notwithstanding
its promise to refer disputes to arbitration, and the employee seeks arbitration. See Legg,
Mason & Co., Inc. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.D.C. 1972).
20 See infra Part V.
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arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 21 This statute, enacted in
1925, is the subject of an intense controversy that pits, on one hand, judges and
academics who believe that it covers most private-sector employees, 22 and those
who believe that the law is meant only for businesses that have commercial
disputes.23 Since current public policy weighs strongly in favor of FAA coverage
of predispute employment arbitration agreements, it is important to assess how
courts viewed arbitration before this law was enacted. The conventional view of
this history, which the Supreme Court currently cites in its favorable
pronouncements of mandatory employment arbitration, is that Congress passed
the FAA to counteract judicial hostility to private adjudication. 24
Although there is some evidence to support to this view, 25 we do not accept
it as an article of faith. 26 Our research begins with a court ruling in 1746, and
traces the relationship between American courts and arbitration through passage
of the FAA.27 These early courts enforced predispute arbitration agreements
more often than is currently recognized. 28 Interestingly, common law principles
from these decisions are reflected in current court opinions that regulate
21 Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. § 1 (2000)) (originally called the United States Arbitration Act, or USAA).
22 An academic perspective is offered in Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1349 (1997). For a
judicial view, see generally Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), discussed infra notes 173-81.
23 See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment
Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 479 (2001) for an academic
critique, and Craft v. Campbell Soup Co. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), discussed infra
notes 187-89, for a pro-employee reading of the FAA.
24 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), discussed infra note 180.
25 See infra note 159.
26 Nor does Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration
Statutes on the Development ofArbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479,
486 (1995) ("[T]he assumption of court hostility toward arbitration prior to passage of
modem arbitration statutes in the 1920s is clearly unwarranted for some courts, and perhaps
unwarranted for most."); see also Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the
Presumption of Arbitrability: David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 58
BROOK. L. REV. 279, 298, n.104 (1992) (citation omitted) (finding that the "Supreme
Court's unsupported observation that judicial hostility to arbitration rested upon judicial
jealousy was considered and rejected in the well-reasoned opinion of the Second Circuit in
Kulukundis Shipping Co.").
27 Our research was guided by Addison C. Burnham, Arbitration as a Condition
Precedent, 11 HARV. L. REv. 234 (1897); Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial
Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L. J. 595 (1927); Wesley A. Sturges, CommercialArbitration or
Court Application of Common Law Rule of Marketing?, 34 YALE L.J. 480 (1925); Joseph
Wheless, Arbitration as a Judicial Process of Law, 30 W.VA. L.Q. 209 (1924).
28 See infra Parts II.A-II.C.
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mandatory arbitration,29 even though these original sources have been.lost over
time. Individual employment arbitration has a much longer history than is
understood. 30
We examine this history, not to put our own interpretive gloss on'the FAA,
3
'
but to discern patterns over time in judicial oversight of arbitration. Using
extensive empirical data, we conclude that American courts have never been
hostile to arbitration, nor have they abdicated their role as public adjudicators.
Courts have steered a more intermediate course by enforcing predispute
arbitration agreements, while reserving power to void or reform the most
objectionable arrangements in these contracts.
These results have important implications for the current controversy over
mandatory arbitration. To employers who rely upon proarbitration signals from
Gilmer and Circuit City, we show that lower courts do not refer disputes to
arbitration as reflexively as these landmark cases suggest should occur. Thus,
employers who wish to test the limits of self-advantage in these agreements will
be discouraged to see empirical evidence that courts abrogate a variety of one-
sided arrangements. 32
Critics of mandatory arbitration will also be unsettled by the results of this
study. Relying on textual passages from leading Supreme Court cases, they
worry that federal courts are in lock-step agreement with the pro-arbitration
Justices who authored these decisions. Some believe that a legislative remedy is
needed to undo damage from the Supreme Court. 33 The reality is, however, that
lower courts sidestep these precedents more often than is realized. This Article
shows that the judiciary is currently developing a set of due process guidelines
consistent with common law traditions dating to the early nineteenth century.
34
In summary, our main finding is that courts behave more consistently over
extended periods than either arbitration advocates or critics realize.
29 See infra Part VII.
30 See infra Part II.B.
31 For an insightful interpretation of the FAA, see Matthew W. Finkin, Workers'
Contracts Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17
BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 290-98 (1996).
32 See infra Part VI.
33 See Bill Prohibiting Predispute Arbitration Agreements in Employee Contracts
Debated in California, 12 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP'T (Nov. 2001); Simon J. Nadel,
Arbitration: Mandatory Programs Not For All Employers, DAILY LAB. REP., No. 102, May
28, 2002, at C- I (discussing recently proposed federal legislation to exclude all employment
contracts from FAA coverage, thereby negating mandatory employment arbitration).
3 4 See infra Part VII.
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B. Organization of This Article
Part II presents a detailed history of the common law of arbitration before
Congress passed the FAA.35 This original research is significant because it
provides evidence that courts were not hostile to arbitration, as the Supreme
Court and current arbitration advocates claim. This research also shows that
courts either embraced arbitration or imposed reasonable limits on its use. Part
II.A examines early common law doctrines that regulated predispute arbitration
agreements. 36 Support is provided for the conventional view that early courts
protected their jurisdiction from competition with arbitrations. 37 We show,
however, that these courts imposed reasonable limits on arbitration, contrary to
notions that they were hostile to this dispute resolution method. Our discussion
then turns to a variety of court decisions that approved the use of arbitration. 38
Part II.B highlights early examples of individual employment arbitration, and
analyzes common law regulation of these workplace disputes.39 Part II.C
challenges as a fallacy the idea that courts were hostile to arbitration before the
FAA.40
In Part III, we examine how the FAA applies to predispute employment
arbitration agreements. 41 Its legislative history is studied to determine whether
Congress intended it to be applied to employment contracts. 42 The discussion
proceeds to current Supreme Court decisions that instruct federal courts to
enforce predispute workplace arbitration agreements under the auspices of the
FAA. 43 We also explain the tension between the Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and explore ramifications of this pointed
disagreement. 44
Our research methodology for this study is presented in Part IV.45 We begin
by briefly reviewing examples of policy-oriented research that pervade the
35 See infra notes 58-146.
36 See infra notes 58-108.
37 See infra notes 80-92.
38 See infra notes 93-108.
39 See infra notes 109-27.
40 See infra notes 128-46.
41 See infra notes 147-209.
42 See infra notes 151-59.
43 See infra notes 163-18 1, and 203-07.
44 See infra notes 185-202.
45 See infra notes 210-44.
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subject of mandatory arbitration. 46 Next, we justify the need for more empirical
research. 47 This is followed by a careful discussion of how the sample of cases in
this study was assembled. 48
Parts V and VI present our empirical findings. Part V answers the question,
"How has judicial enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements changed
over time?" 49 This question allows us to assess court behavior over three
contemporary periods of Supreme Court regulation. Tables 150 and 251
summarize our findings, respectively, for district and appellate courts. Part VI
identifies trends in how federal courts rule on particular legal issues that
employees use to challenge mandatory arbitration agreements. 52 Tables A53 and
B 54 present these findings for district and appellate courts.
Part VII states our two main conclusions. 55 First, federal courts continuously
regulate a dispute resolution process that is not adequately addressed by the FAA
or Supreme Court precedents. These issues, which we illustrate with late-
breaking decisions, cover eleven different facets of mandatory employment
arbitration. 56 Second, although federal courts are mostly inclined to permit
employers to unilaterally require their employees to forgo litigation of
employment disputes, they increasingly resist problematical forms of mandatory
arbitration. 57 This conclusion relates to our historical findings in Part II, and
underscores our thesis: Courts in the past were never hostile to arbitration, nor
are they presently inclined to take a laissez-faire approach. Instead, they have
consistently taken on a supervisory role over the past 200 years. In sum, while
courts have allowed parties to resolve their disputes privately, they also have
remained available to guard against procedural and substantive abuses of this
method.
46 See infra notes 210-11.
47 See infra notes 212-30.
48 See infra notes 231-44.
49 See infra notes 245-47.
50 See infra pp. 301.
51 See infra pp. 302.
52 See infra notes 248-86.
53 See infra pp. 310.
54 See infra pp. 312.
55 See infra notes 287-364.
56 See infra notes 290-350.
57 See infra notes 351-64.
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II. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE ENACTMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES ARBITRATION ACT (FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT)
A. Early Common Law Doctrines That Regulated Predispute Arbitration
Agreements
The current popularity of arbitration cannot be attributed to a single source;
however, Chief Justice Warren Burger is often credited for advocating wider use
of ADR.58 The following quotation reflected his thinking: "The ancient niceties
and technicalities applied to arbitrations have given way to a more liberal and
rational construction. This mode of ending litigation is to be encouraged. '59
Remarkably, this view of the law and its policy prescription were stated by an
1880 Kentucky court of appeals. It epitomizes the main theme of this Part:
There is more myth than fact to the widely accepted 'view that American courts
were hostile to arbitration before the United States Arbitration Act (later
amended to be called FAA) was enacted in 1925.
The idea that arbitration was in competition with courts is not unfounded,
but this study shows that the tension between judges and arbitrators is
significantly overstated. Judicial hostility to arbitration is traced to a decision in
1746, Kill v. Hollister, which ruled that an arbitration agreement could not "oust
this court."'60 Early American courts were influenced by this English idea.61
According to an 1897 study, although some courts accepted bargained-for
arbitration as a condition precedent to litigation, many gave no effect.to such
agreements. 62 This history is relevant because the Supreme Court has repeatedly
asserted that the FAA was enacted "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been
adopted by American courts."6 3
58 See generally Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (March
1982); and Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Needfor Systematic Anticipation,
Keynote Address Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 83, 93-96
(1976).
59 Adams'Adm'r v. Ringo, 79 Ky. 211 (Ky. Ct. App. 1880).
60 Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (1746).
61 Courts from the 1800s quoted Lord Kenyon's emphatic rejection of a motion to
enforce a predispute arbitration agreement: "It has been decided again and again that an
agreement to refer all matters in difference to arbitration is not sufficient to oust the courts of
law or equity of their jurisdiction." See, e.g.,Thompson v. Charnock, 8 Term R., 134, 139 (N.
Y. ed. of 1834, 91) (emphasis added).
62 See Burnham, supra note 27.
63 In its pronouncement on this point nearly thirty years ago in Sherk v. Alberto-Culver.,
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But modem authorities, including the Supreme Court, oversimplify this
history.64 A scholarly New York decision from 1832 shows that many pre-
industrial courts propounded common law rules in support of arbitration. 65 Like
a well-preserved fossil, this decision recites these principles from the early
1800s:
*"By referring a case to arbitration, the court divests itself of its judicial
power." 66
*"An award made in good faith, although erroneous, is conclusive. The
dissent of one of the arbitrators subsequently to an award regularly made will not
invalidate it."'6 7
*"An award may be good in part, and void in part."'68
*"After an award has been executed, the court will not set it aside, upon the
417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974), the Court recounted that "English courts traditionally
considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the courts of jurisdiction, and
refused to enforce such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by American
courts as part of the common law up to the time of the adoption of the Arbitration Act." Id.
at 5 10 n.4. The Court reiterated this view in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 219.-20 n.6 (1985). This appears to be the last time that the Court provided evidence to
support its view that courts were once hostile to arbitration.
64 Years ago, the Supreme Court made an effort to support this proposition. See, e.g.,
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (quoting U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006,
1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)); see also Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 220 (explaining that when
Congress passed the FAA it was "motivated, first and foremost, by a desire" to reverse long-
standing judicial resistance to arbitration). Recent cases, however, simply state the idea that
the FAA was intended to reverse long-standing judicial hostility to arbitration without
referring to historical cases, so that now it is not clear that the Justices understand the origins
or accuracy of their repeated assertions. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
65 See Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige Ch. 124, 138 n.1 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
66 Id. (citing McKim v. Thompson, 1 Bland's Ch. Rep. 150, 175 (Md. 1827)).
67 Id. (citing Winship v. Jewett, 1 Barb. Ch. 173 (N.Y. Ch. 1845)); see also Maysville,
W.P. & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Waters, 6 Dana 62, 69, 36 Ky. 62 (Ct. App. 1837) (stating a
nearly identical rule: "Submission to the arbitration of three or any two, two join in the
award giving notice of the award concluded, and being about to be returned to the third, who
does not join in it; held, that this is no objection to the validity of the award.").
68 Id. (citing Brown v. Warnock, 5 Dana 492, 493, 35 Ky. 492 (Ct. App. 1837)); see
also id. (citing Banks v. Adams, 23 Me. 259 (1843) (stating, "An award may be good for part
and bad for part; and the part which is good will be sustained, if it be not so connected with
the part which is bad, that injustice will thereby be done.").
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ground that the arbitrators were not sworn. '"69
*"The technicalities and niceties once favored in relation to awards are no
longer allowed." 70
*"An award must decide the whole matter submitted, and must not extend to
any other matter not comprehended in the submission; and it must be certain,
final and conclusive upon the whole matter referred. 71
."Awards are much favored, and the court will intend everything in their
favor." 72
o"Chancery will not lend its aid to disturb an award, where the party making
the application has paid the amount awarded against him, and acquiesced in the
award for a period of five or six years." 73
."Where an award upon its face purports to be final, and recites all the
matters and things submitted, it is prima facie final, and the party impeaching it
must show proof to the contrary." 74
Judicial support for arbitration continued throughout the 1800s. Some courts
favored arbitration because of its procedural simplicity 75 and efficiency. 76 Others
69 Id. (citing Johnson's Ex'rs v. Ketchum, 3 Green's Ch. Rep. 364). See also id. (citing
Combs v. Little, 3 Green's Ch. Rep. 310) (providing that "if arbitrators are not sworn, the
whole proceeding is utterly void").
70 Id. (citing Shockey's Adm'r v. Glasford, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 9, 10 (Ct. App. 1837)).
71 Id. (citing Carnochan v. Christie, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 446 (1826); Lutz v. Linthicum,
33 U.S. (8 Peters) 165 (1834); Carey v. Wilcox, 6 N. H. 177, 180 (1883)); see also id. (citing
Johnshon's Ex'rs v. Ketchum, 3 Green's Ch. Rep. 364, expressing the rule "[w]here an
account has been settled by arbitrators, and a bond and mortgage given for the sum awarded
to be due, the court will not, except in case of gross wrong, permit the account to be re-
investigated, or the validity of the award to be contested."). This principle preserved the
finality of arbitrator awards. Other courts agreed with this idea but phrased it differently. See
id. (citing Armstrong v. Robinson, 5 G. & J. 412, 419 (Md. 1833) ("[An award] must pursue
the submission, or it is void.")); see also id. ("Arbitrators are presumed to have pursued the
submission, and the award is valid until the contrary appears.") (citing Carey, 6 N. H. at
177).
72 Id. (citing Tankersley v. Richardson, 2 Stew. 130 (Ala. 1829)).
73 Id. (citing McRae v. Buck, 2 Stew. & P. 155 (Ala. 1832)).
74 Id.
75 See Brush v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446, 448 (Mich. 1888) (expressing this rationale for
enforcing arbitration awards):
They are made by a tribunal of the parties' own selection, who are usually, at least,
expected to act on their own view of law and testimony more freely and less technically
than courts and regular juries. They are also generally expected to frame their decisions
on broad views of justice, which may sometimes deviate from the strict rules of law.
Id.
76 Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige Ch. 124, 138 (N.Y.Ch. 1832):
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believed that parties had a right to enter into contracts to resolve their disputes,
and therefore deferred to the parties' choice of an arbitrator. 77 Judges respected
the finality that parties intended by using this process. 78 The Michigan Supreme
Court summarized this supportive philosophy: "[T]here is power in a court of
equity to relieve against awards in some cases where there has been fraud and
misconduct in the arbitrators, or they have acted under some manifest
mistake .... But it is evident that there are greater objections to any general
interference by courts with awards." 79
Nineteenth century courts were far from unanimous in treating arbitration
agreements. Indeed, many courts put limits on the use of arbitration. However,
few if any courts completely rejected arbitration. Instead, they monitored this
process for abuses. When considering the following cases, recall that arbitration
was often the product of a predispute agreement. As a result, courts applied
common law contract doctrines to ensure minimum standards of fair conduct and
accountability to the law-for example, the duty to execute contracts without
violating a law or public policy, the prohibition against taking undue advantage
of a weaker party, and the like.
If every party who arbitrates, in relation to a contested claim, to save trouble and
expense, is to be subjected to a chancery suit, and to several hundred dollars cost, if the
arbitrators happened to err upon a doubtful question as to the admissibility of a witness,
the sooner these domestic tribunals of the parties' own selection are abolished, the
better. Such a principle is wholly inconsistent with common sense, and cannot be the
law of a court of equity. There is, therefore, nothing in the proceedings before the
arbitrators which could justify any court in setting aside those proceeding for fraud, or
improper conduct, or any other irregularity.
77 E.g., Neely v. Buford, 65 Mo. 448, 451 (1877) ("[C]ourts are disposed to regard
with favor these tribunals of the parties' own selection.").
78 See Port Huron & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Callanan, 34 N.W. 678, 679 (Mich. 1887) ("It is not
expected that after resorting to such private tribunals either party may repudiate their action
and fall back on the courts.").
79 Brush, 38 N.W. at 447-48. The court elaborated:
It is a well-settled rule in equity.., that an award of arbitrators of the parties' own
choosing,unless outrageously excessive on the face of it, and such as would induce
every honest man at first blush to cry out against it, cannot be set aside, unless there be
corruption, partiality, misconduct, or the use of an excess of power in the arbitrators, or
fraud upon the opposite party.
Id. at 450 (quoting Van Cortlandt v. Underhill, 17 Johns. 405, 420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1819)). Knowing that the losing party at arbitration might be tempted to back down
from its original promise to abide by the arbitrator's award, the court observed that "the
office of arbitrator is one voluntarily assumed, and is many times a thankless task, and
parties often feel aggrieved at their findings." Id.
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To begin, a particular line of cases supports the conventional view that early
courts protected their jurisdiction from competition with arbitrations. 80 Some
judges theorized that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute could not "oust" a court
of its jurisdiction. 81 Joseph Story, who co-held positions as Associate Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court and Professor of Law at Harvard, reported this rule of
non-divestiture in his influential treatise, Commentaries on Equity
Jurisprudence.82 Non-divestiture was also used with the contract doctrine that a
duty to arbitrate is a condition precedent to filing a lawsuit.83 By similar
reasoning, some courts held that a party's participation in an arbitration did not
waive her right to sue. 84
Even in the 1800s, arbitration was widely appreciated for its cost-saving
advantages. 85 However, this did not stop a few courts from preserving access to
courts, even when a reluctant litigant intended to limit dispute resolution costs.
To illustrate, a person who signed a predispute arbitration agreement claimed
that he was harmed when the other party sued because the resulting trial
increased his lawyer fees by a ten-fold factor. The court was unsympathetic to
this argument. Citing the doctrine of non-divestiture, it refused to enforce the
expectancy of lower dispute resolution costs by denying recovery of attorney fees
80 Reviewing a variety of earlier decisions, US. Asphalt Ref Co., 222 F. at 1010-11,
summarized this view: "The courts will scarcely permit any other body of men to even
partially perform judicial work, and will never permit the absorption of all the business
growing out of disputes over a contract by any body of arbitrators, unless compelled to such
action by statute."
81 See Gray v. Wilson, 4 Watts 39 (Pa. 1835); Randel v. Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co.,
1 Del. (1 Harr.) 233 (Super. Ct. 1833); Allen v. Watson, 16 Johns. 205 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819);
Rowley v. Young, 3 Day 118 (Conn. 1808); Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 H. & J. 408
(Md. 1825); Aspinwall v. Towsey, 2 Tyl. 328 (Vt. 1803).
82 JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 145 7(a) (courts will
not specifically enforce arbitration agreements if the effect is to divest the ordinary
jurisdiction of the common tribunals of justice).
83 See Stephenson v. Piscataqua Ins. Co., 54 Me. 55, 70 (1866), stating:
While parties may impose, as a condition precedent to application to the courts, that
they shall first have settled the amount to be recovered by an agreed mode, they cannot
entirely close the access to the courts of law.... Such stipulations are repugnant to the
rest of the contract and assume to divest courts of their established jurisdiction. As
conditions precedent to an appeal to the courts, they are void.
84 See Pierce v. Kirby, 21 Wis. 124 (1866) (stating that a party who replies to a
complaint at arbitration, but otherwise asserts that the arbitrators lack jurisdiction, does not
forgo his right to a judicial forum).
85 See In re Grening, 26 N.Y.S. 117, 119 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1893) (referring to
arbitration as among "simple and inexpensive methods of quieting disputes growing out of
business transactions").
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incurred in litigating a matter that had been set for arbitration. 86
Some judges applied the revocation doctrine to preserve a disputant's access
to courts. This allowed a party to withdraw from arbitration and sue in court. In
the most common case, a person who agreed to arbitration could lawfully revoke
her delegation of power to an arbitrator before a dispute was actually
submitted. 87 The earliest American decisions applied this principle broadly,
allowing a disputant to withdraw from arbitration after a private hearing. These
courts reasoned that the objecting party effectively retracted its submission prior
to the arbitrator entering into an award. 88 Likewise, some courts held that public
policy prohibits arbitration agreements from precluding litigation because private
tribunals could not otherwise be held accountable under the law.89
86 See Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S. Co., 99 F. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1900). In a dispute
over compensation for detention of a steamship beyond the contract period, the parties had
agreed in advance to arbitrate their differences. Nevertheless, the ship's owner refused to
submit to arbitration and sued. His lawsuit was dismissed. The respondent was still unhappy
because he spent $555 in legal fees to enforce the arbitration agreement. He contended that
the cost of legal representation at arbitration would have been only $50. Thus, he sued to
recover this expenditure. The court dismissed this lawsuit, concluding that the first party had
a right to contest the arbitration agreement, even if he lost, noting: "[A]n allowance of the
costs and expenses in the prior suit, seems to be wholly inconsistent with the defendant's
undoubted legal right to bring that action." Id. at 792. This ruling was not novel. Chief
Justice Shaw explained in Reggio v. Braggiotti, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 166, 170 (1851):
But the counsel fees cannot be allowed. These are expenses incurred by the party for his
own satisfaction, and they vary so much with the character and distinction of the
counsel that it would be dangerous to permit him to impose such a charge upon an
opponent; and the law measures the expenses incurred in the management of a suit by
the taxable costs.
See also Miller v. Hays, 26 Ind. 380 (1866) (holding that expenses for attorney and
counsel fees were not recoverable upon an arbitration bond).
87 See Smith v. Compton, 20 Barb. 262 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855); Peters's Adm'r v.
Craig, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 307 (1838); Jones v. Harris, 59 Miss. 214 (1881), overruled by 1P
Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 103 (Miss. 1998) ("right of
either party to revoke a submission before award made, where the submission is not a rule of
court, or regulated by statute changing the common law, is well settled and universally
recognized"); Oregon & W. Mortg. Sav. Bank v. Am. Mortg. Co., 35 F. 22 (C.C. Or. 1888).
88 See Aspinwall v. Towsey, 2 Tyl. 328 (Vt. 1803) (stating that"either party may revoke
such submission before the award made and published, and by such revocation he annuls all
contracts as relative to the submission conditioned in the bond"); see also Allen v. Watson,
16 Johns. 205 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (reasoning that "there can be no doubt that the defendant
could revoke the powers conferred by the arbitration bond").
89 See, e.g., Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (stating that "stipulations [for
arbitration] are regarded as against the policy of the common law, as having a tendency to
exclude the jurisdiction of the courts"). See also Prince Steam-Shipping Co. v. Lehman, 39
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Occasionally, the method of an arbitrator's appointment caused courts to
vacate awards. Even if such selection did not bias the arbitrator, courts viewed it
as an inherent conflict of interest. 90
By another approach, some judges did not preclude arbitrations that'resulted
from a predispute agreement, but treated them as a condition precedent to a
judicial proceeding to enforce an arbitrator's ruling. This allowed courts to
suspend a pending lawsuit to see whether an agreed-upon arbitration procedure
would settle the matter.91 They delayed jurisdiction until the disputants first
made a reasonable effort to resolve their problem in a private forum. 92
Fed. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1889) (remarking that arbitration "agreements have repeatedly been held
to be against public policy, and void"). The best explanation for the policy is in Greason v.
Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491, 496 (1858):
It is well settled that courts of equity will never entertain a suit to compel parties
specifically to perform an agreement to submit to arbitration [citations omitted].To do
so, would bring such courts in conflict with that policy of the common law which
permits parties in all cases to revoke a submission to arbitration already made. This
policy is founded in the obvious importance of securing fairness and impartiality in
every judicial tribunal. Arbitrators being selected, not by law, but by the parties
themselves, there is danger of some secret interest, prejudice or bias in favor of the
party making the selection; and hence the opposite party is allowed, to the latest
moment, to make inquiries on the subject.
90 See Herrick v. Estate of Belknap, 27 Vt. 673, 678 (1854) (The court determined that a
civil engineer employed by a railroad to administer excavation contracts-and who thereby
functioned as an arbitrator or umpire-improperly denied payment to a contractor who was
to be paid according to the amount of earth he removed. Denying effect to this internal
dispute resolution process, the court stated that the "injury has been caused by the fraud or
neglect of their officers .... It was for the interest of the company to have short estimates;
and under these circumstances no actual fraud need be proved."); see also Mansfield &
Sandusky City R.R. Co. v. John P. Veeder & Co., 17 Ohio 385 (1848) (Here, the contract
provided for a professional engineer employed by railroad company to exercise impartial and
independent judgment in determining whether an excavator's claim for payment on a job
should be made. Since the evidence showed that the engineer was mistaken in denying a
claim for payment, the court ruled that this contract worker was entitled to equitable relief
from Ohio courts.).
91 Many courts held that a submission of a pending suit to arbitration suspended the
cause of action. E.g., Ex parte Wright, 6 Cow. 399, 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826); People v.
Onondaga, 1 Wend. 314, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828); Larkin v. Robbins, 2 Wend. 505, 506
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); Towns v. Wilcox, 12 Wend. 503, 504 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); Green v.
Patchin, 13 Wend. 293, 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839); and Wells v. Lain, 15 Wend. 99, 100
(N.Y. 1835).
92 Perkins v. U.S. Electric Light Co., 16 F. 513, 515 (C.C.N.Y. 1881) provided this
statement of the law:
It is familiar doctrine that a simple agreement inserted in a contract, that the parties
will refer any dispute arising thereunder to arbitration, will not oust courts of law of
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While judges limited arbitrations, they still permitted them to occur. This can
hardly be said to constitute judicial hostility. And that is about as difficult as
American courts in the 1800s were on arbitration. The boundary that separated
autonomous from regulated arbitrations was marked by key jurisdictional phrases
in predispute agreements. 93 If a contract expressly provided for judgment on the
award, courts asserted jurisdiction and functioned as an appellate tribunal.94 But
if the agreement submitted the matter to arbitration, this was treated as a
discontinuance of the right to sue.95 By extension, some courts reasoned that
their ordinary jurisdiction. Either party may sue the other upon the contract without
having offered to arbitrate. He may be liable for damages for a breach of his agreement
to arbitrate; but the agreement will not bar his suit. If, however, the contract stipulates
that the arbitration is to be a condition precedent to the right to sue upon the contract,
or if this may be inferred upon construction, no suit can be maintained unless the
plaintiff has made all reasonable effort to comply with the condition. But under the
agreement here there is no cause of action upon the facts as they exist. The agreement
which creates the obligation of the defendant provides the mode by which the extent of
the obligation is to be ascertained.
Id.
93 This is demonstrated by the technical usage in Camp v. Root, 18 Johns. 22, 23
(N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1820) (emphasis added):
This is plainly a case of submission to arbitration; it is, in no respect, a reference under
the statute. The parties chose to enter their submission upon the minutes of the court,
and to direct the arbitrator to make report to the court; but all this does not vary the
rights of the parties, nor authorize the court to give judgment immediately on the award.
The submission to arbitration was a discontinuance of the suit.
See also Ex Parte Wright, 6 Cow. 399, 399 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1826) ("A general submission of a
cause to arbitration is a discontinuance; but not where the parties agree that ajudgment may
be entered on the report. And in such a case, if the submission be revoked, the court may
proceed with the cause to trial, notwithstanding the submission.").
94 See Green, 13 Wend. at 296, holding:
[I]n all actions not referrible [sic] under the statute, if the parties refer the cause
toreferees, by stipulation or rule, or both, and merely provide that the referees
report, such reference is an arbitration, and operates as a discontinuance. But if the
stipulation of the parties provides that a judgment shall be entered upon the report
or award, and judgment is entered accordingly, the parties are concluded by their
own agreement ....
95 See Roger's Heirs v. Nail, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 28, 28 (1845) (stating that "[i]f parties
to a suit in court, by bond, submit the cause to the decision of arbitrators, without making
any provision in the submission to continue the jurisdiction of the court, such reference will
not work a discontinuance"). The doctrine appears to have originated in Larkin, 2 Wend. at
506:
The reason that the submission operates as a discontinuance, is not because the
subject of the suit is otherwise disposed of than by the decision of the court in
which it was prosecuted; but because the parties have selected another tribunal for
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commencement of a lawsuit did not constitute a submission to arbitration. 96
Courts that perceived unique advantages to arbitration as a dispute resolution
method added to the case law that allowed this private process to resolve
disputes. Arbitration was perceived as superior for resolving price 97 or
damages 98 disputes. Similarly, courts deferred to arbitrators with unique
expertise or trustworthiness. 99 In a related development, courts affirmed the use
the trial of it. The court will not look to the proceedings of that tribunal to
determine whether the suit is gone beyond its jurisdiction. It is sufficient that the
parties have selected their arbitrators, and concluded their agreement to submit to
them. It is this agreement which withdraws the cause from the court, and effects
the discontinuance of the suit.
96 E.g., Van Antwerp v. Stewart, 8 Johns. 125, 125 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
97 See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250, 262-63
(1872):
This was, in substance and effect, a provision for establishing the rate of toll to be
charged and collected, in case of a difference between the parties, and equivalent to an
agreement in words that, in case the parties should differ, arbitrators should be chosen
who should, by the rules and formula prescribed, establish and determine the rate of
additional toll, and that their award should be final. The subject-matter in view was
peculiarly fit and proper for submission to the arbitrament of experts and practical
business men rather than courts and juries; and the manner agreed upon was a provident
and reasonable provision for the adjustment of rights and differences, which, in their
nature, could not be as well or satisfactorily settled and determined in any other way.
The relation of the parties to each other and the character and extent of the business
contemplated under the contract called for an amicable and speedy adjustment of the
rate of toll, and the charges which should be imposed upon the property of one for the
benefit of the other.
See also Faunce v. Burke & Gonder, 16 Pa. 469, 482 (1851) (referring to "quantity, quality,
and value" of disputed work).
98 E.g., Hamilton v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 242, 243 (1890),
shows the common feature in an insurance policy by which arbitrators were to ascertain the
amount of loss or damage to an insured property. These contracts permitted insurers to
withhold payment on any loss, without legal recourse, until an award was obtained. Thus,
Justice Gray observed that neutral appraisal or arbitration was a condition precedent to any
lawsuit:
Such a stipulation, not ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, but leaving the
general question of liability to be judicially determined, and simply providing a
reasonable method of estimating and ascertaining the amount of the loss, is
unquestionably valid, according to the uniform current of authority in England and in
this country.
Id. at 255.
99 See, e.g., Forshey v. Galveston, Houston, & Henderson R.R. Co., 16 Tex. 516, 519-
20 (1856). An arbitration panel, created by a contract between a civil engineer and railroad
company, awarded the former $2270 in unpaid wages. Id. The Texas Supreme Court
remarked that "courts always regard with peculiar favor trials of this character by judges of
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of arbitration for construction disputes.100
Many courts not only held parties to their promise to arbitrate, but prevented
them from reneging. A pre-Civil War case concluded that an arbitrator's mistake
was insufficient grounds to vacate the award.101 A particularly deferential court
stated that awards should be enforced even upon evidence that the arbitrator was
biased, as long as the arbitrator's partiality was known to the parties during the
proceeding and the losing party did not withdraw the submission. 02
Finally, the notion that pre-FAA courts were hostile to arbitration ignores
evidence that many states institutionalized arbitration. There is no suggestion that
these laws were passed to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration. It appears,
instead, that arbitration was established by law to enable businesses to avoid
messy lawsuits. Courts in Texas, 10 3 New York, 104 Iowa, 105 Louisiana, 10 6
the parties' own choosing, and that no ordinary or slight cause will induce the courts to
disregard the award, and that awards, in the absence of fraud or gross mistake, have the
conclusive effect of judgments." Id. at 524.
100 E.g., Schwartz v. Cronan, 30 La. Ann. 993, 997 (1878) (statute provided for
arbitration in construction disputes); Colter v. Frese, 45 Ind. 96, 99 (1873) (statute provided
for arbitration between contractors, workmen, furnishers of materials, and other employees
and creditors); S.S. & W. Wood v. Donaldson, 17 Wend. 550, 553-54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837)
(statute provided for arbitration in dispute involving contractor and creditors); and Turcott v.
Hall, 8 Ala. 522, 524-25 (1845) (Mobile, Alabama provided for arbitration in dispute
involving contractor and workmen).
101 See Byrd v. Odem, 9 Ala. 755, 766 (1846) (citations omitted):
That arbitration and award was recognized at the common law, as a mode of
adjusting matters in dispute, especially such as concerned personal chattels, or personal
wrongs, is a clear proposition. And whenever the thing in dispute may be passed
without writing, an oral submission and an award, has all the effect of a written one. A
misjudgment of arbitrators, (although it may be a misapprehension of law,) on a case
fairly before them, is not alone sufficient cause for setting aside an award. It has
accordingly been held, that if an action of slander be submitted, and the arbitrators
award a sum of money for words which are not actionable, the court will not interfere to
set it aside.
102 See Fox v. Hazelton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 275, 278 (1830) (holding that since
objecting party "was content to proceed with the knowledge of the fact, relying upon the
strength of his cause, or the capacity and firmness of the other referees, he must be deemed
to have waived his exceptions").
103 See Henderson v. Beaton, 52 Tex. 29, 34-36 (1879) (upholding the constitutionality
of a Texas statute enacted in 1879 that provided for a board of referees or arbitrators to
dispose of civil actions by the consent of parties).
104 See Howard v. Sexton, 1 Denio 440, 441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (finding that an
arbitration tribunal established under New York law is not defective even if arbitrators fail to
take oath as established by law); see also Wood, 17 Wend at 553-54 (statute providing for
arbitration in dispute involving contractor and creditors).
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Indiana, 107 and Alabama 108 upheld these statutes.
B. Common Law Regulation of Individual Employment Arbitration
Common law regulation of predispute arbitration also grew out of
employment controversies. The earliest example appears to be an 1838 Kentucky
case. 109 A novice artist who was employed to paint family portraits signed a
predispute arbitration agreement with his employer. The employer accepted the
paintings and hung them in his house but refused payment to the artist, claiming
that the portraits bore no resemblance to his family.I 10 The artist sued to recover
$65, but the employer simultaneously submitted the matter to arbitration. Acting
before a trial was held, the arbitrators denied payment to the artist.111 Applying
the revocation doctrine, the Kentucky court refused to enforce the award.' 12
Courts also reviewed ecclesiastical arbitrations of employment disputes. In
Fain v. Goodwin, an individual who worked as a bookkeeper and salesman sued
under his employment contract.1 13 His termination for negligence and poor
performance was previously arbitrated by a Baptist church."14 Dual proceedings
produced conflicting outcomes: an arbitration ruling for the employer, and a
105 See Conger v. Dean, 3 Iowa 463, 465-66 (1856) (holding that a state statute did not
provide common law right to submit controversies to arbitration, but prescribed procedures
for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards).
106 See Schwartz v. Cronan, 30 La. Ann 993, 997 (1878) (arbitration in construction
disputes).
107 See Colter v. Frese, 45 Ind. 96, 99 (1873) (arbitration between contractors,
workmen, furnishers of materials, and other employees and creditors).
108 See Turcott v. Hall, 8 Ala. 522, 524-25 (1845) (arbitration in dispute involving
contractor and workmen).
109 See Peters's Adm'r v. Craig, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 307, 307 (1838).
'
10 Id.
I Id.
112 See id. at 308. The court reversed the arbitrators' award because it saw no evidence
that the parties agreed to be bound by it:
From any thing appearing, their object may have been only to ascertain the opinion
of the two referees as a mere auxiliary to a settlement by themselves. Nor does it appear
that, if there had been a binding submission, there was not a revocation of it before the
award was made; for this suit was brought the day after the reference, and the evidence
does not show that the award had been regularly made and completed before that time.
Such a submission might have been revoked by either party prior to a binding award;
and the institution of this suit was an implied revocation, unless the award had been
conclusively made before the suit was commenced.
113 Fain v. Goodwin, 35 Ark. 109, 110 (1879).
114Id. at 113.
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courtjudgment for the bookkeeper. 115 The Arkansas Supreme Court negated the
arbitration by affirming the monetary judgment for the plaintiff."16
While these two courts abrogated private forms of workplace dispute
resolution, others did not interfere. Perry v. Wheeler is a case in point. 117 After a
minister believed he was not paid fully under his employment contract, he
refused to handover the rectory and church grounds. 118 This standoff was
submitted to a church board that exercised adjudicatory powers after the
minister's employment was terminated.11 9 The Kentucky Court of Appeals saw
no difference between an arbitration panel and this ecclesiastical board since the
latter was expressly established by the national church charter to resolve
employment disputes between ministers and their individual rectors or churches,
and disputants were allowed to nominate and also strike persons from a five-
member panel. 120 The court upheld this private method, reasoning that "the right
of the contracting parties to have this relief existed from the beginning, and grew
out of the very nature of their contract."1 21 It concluded that "the board acting in
this case was legally organized, and... within the scope of its powers, and hence
that its recommendations, approved, as they have been, by the bishop of the
diocese, must be respected by the civil tribunals."' 122
Courts upheld the use of arbitration in other work settings. In Perkins v.
United States Electric Light Co. 123 the Circuit Court for the Southern District of
New York denied an employee's motion to enjoin an arbitration of his patent
claims against his employer. The court remarked that:
[T]he parties here selected the means of determining what price should be
allowed for property, the value of which is always more or less speculative and
conjectural. The case is one where it is peculiarly appropriate that they should
be held to their contract according to its terms and intent. 124
115 Id. at 112.
116Id. at 113.
117 Perry v. Wheeler & Co., 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 541, 556 (1877).
118 Id. at 547-48.
119 Id. at 546-47.
120 Id. at 554.
121 Id. at 556.
122 Id.
123 Perkins v. U.S. Elec. Light Co., 16 F. 513, 515-16 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1881).
124 Id. at 516.
125 E.g., Forshey v. Galveston, Houston, & Henderson R.R. Co., 16 Tex. 516, 520-21
(1856); and Choctaw & Memphis R.R. Co. v. Newton, 140 F. 225, 248-49 (8th Cir. 1905).
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More often, disputes arose between excavation workers and railroads who
employed them. 125 These parties were bound by arbitration clauses that named
civil engineers employed by the railroad as umpires to resolve contractual
disputes over the amount of excavated earth. In Herrick v. Estate of Belknap,
Chief Justice Redfield explained why these agreements should be enforced:
We think there can be no question that this stipulation does bind the parties
to abide the decision of the arbitrator named, as much as that of any other
umpire or arbitrator. And, in one sense, the submission to the determination of
the engineer is more obligatory than any ordinary submission, inasmuch as
being upon consideration, is not revocable, and the obligation upon the
defendants to pay, does not, by the terms of the contract, arise, until the
estimates are made by the engineers. 126
He also reasoned, however, that the special nature of this employment
contract required court supervision to prevent abuse of process or unjust results:
But, this being a peculiar species of contract, so far as the umpirage is
concerned, that being referred to the agents and servants of one of the
contracting parties, persons in the employ, under the control, and in the pay of
that party, it seems, from necessary implication, to impose upon that party the
obligation to employ competent, upright, trustworthy persons, in this service-
and to see to it that they did this service in the proper time, and in the proper
manner. 127
To summarize, this research shows that early American courts were not
hostile to arbitration. They did, however, regulate its use to the point of careful
supervision. What, therefore, is the basis for the idea that courts resisted
Cf., Mansfield & Sandusky City R.R. Co. v. John P. Veeder & Co., 17 Ohio 385, 388
(1848).
126 Herrick v. Estate of Belknap, 27 Vt. 673, 679-80 (1854).
127 See id. at 680. The court concluded by taking this sensible middle ground approach:
[T]hese estimates, when made, are, no doubt, entitled to the common presumption in
their favor .... But, being of a nature where perfect accuracy is attainable, or nearly so,
and made by a class of persons altogether in the interest and under the control of one of
the contracting parties, it would impose, doubtless, some duty of watchfulness, as to the
persons employed, and, also, in regard to abstaining from all attempts... at influencing
them in their action in the premises .... It must be obvious to all, that, the parties must
have felt the necessity of such an umpirage, or they would not have provided for it,-
and that, having provided for it, by the express stipulations of their contract, they must
now abide by it, and not expect a court of equity to relieve them from the probable
consequence of their contract, however disastrous it may possibly have proved, to their
reasonable or unreasonable anticipations.
Id.
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arbitration? That question is now taken up.
C. The Fallacy That Common Law Doctrines Were Hostile to Arbitration
The impression that courts were unfriendly to arbitration is not without
foundation. This Part traces the source of this idea and demonstrates that it
resulted from a distorted reading of key precedents that adjusted the balance
between private and public adjudication.
Several early Supreme Court decisions contributed to the current
misunderstanding that courts were hostile to arbitration. Consider, however, that
two of these cases involved an exceptional conflict between arbitration and
admiralty courts-the latter known for its jurisdictional singularity. In Hobart v.
Drogan128 and Potomac Steam Boat Co. v. Baker Salvage Co., 129 the Court
denied effect to predispute arbitration agreements that it deemed "valueless" in
the presence of this special body of law. 130 The fact that the Supreme Court gave
128 Hobart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 108, 118-19 (1836).
129 Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Baker Salvage Co. (In re The Excelsior), 123 U.S. 40,
49-51 (1887). The Court ruled that an agreement to arbitrate the amount of compensation for
saving a vessel and cargo would not bar jurisdiction in a lawsuit for salvage. It explained:
This, however, was valueless as an agreement. It could not have been pleaded as any
answer to an action for salvage brought in the ordinary way in the Admiralty Division,
and if effect could have been given to it at all, it would only have been by bringing an
action upon it for not submitting to arbitration.
Id. at 51 (quoting In re The Raisby, 10 P.D. 114 (1885)).
130 See generally In re The Excelsior, 123 U.S. 40, 49-51 (1887). The captain of a
salvage company and owner of a sunken ship agreed to arbitrate any dispute arising out of a
contract to raise the stricken vessel. The salvor responded to an urgent telegram from the
captain of a sunken steamer to remove her cargo, pump her out, and tow her safely into port
after the steamer sank in a collision with a large tug boat. Id. at 41. Just as the salvor was
beginning to work on the steamer, the captain of the sunken vessel asked what it would cost
to recover the vessel, to which the captain of the salvors replied, "I do not know." Id. at 43.
The captain replied, "This is not a salvage service," appearing to imply he simply wanted a
tow to safe harbor. The salvage captain answered, "Call it what you please, so I get my pay."
Id. The facts suggest that the vessel could not be towed without making certain repairs.
Nevertheless, after the captain repeated, "It is no salvage service," the men agreed to submit
the amount to be paid to arbitration, in case the salvage company and the owners of the
vessel could not agree upon a fair price. Id. After successfully raising, patching, and towing
the steamer to port, the salvage company billed the steamer for an amount that the latter
considered too high. Id. at 48. The owner of the stricken vessel sought to arbitrate the claim,
but the salvage company successfully sued on an admiralty claim in federal court. Id. In
denying the steamship owner's claim for arbitration, the Supreme Court relied on admiralty
law that regarded arbitration agreements as "valueless." Id. at 51.
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primacy to admiralty law is scarcely a good reason to conclude that the Court
broadly condemned arbitration as a worthless form of dispute resolution. 131
Then there is the influential case Home Insurance Co. of New York v.
Morse,132 expressing doubt that a person who consents to arbitration irrevocably
waives the right to a judicial forum. This decision enumerated early English
decisions that supported the anti-arbitration doctrine of ouster. Home Insurance
reported that American judges were influenced by the Lord Chancellor's dictum,
previously reported in Scott v. Avery and Kill v. Hollester, that rejected
arbitration as an unlawful intrusion upon judicial authority:
There is no doubt of the general principle that parties cannot by contract oust
the ordinary courts of their jurisdiction. That has been decided in many cases.
Perhaps the first case I need refer to was a case decided about a century ago
[referring to Kill v. Hollester]. That case was an action on a policy of insurance
in which there was a clause that in case of any loss or dispute it should be
referred to arbitration. It was decided there that an action would lie, although
there had been no reference to arbitration. 133
The U.S. Supreme Court expanded upon these English precedents to
131 Reinforcing this point, consider that Congress created special procedures under
Section 8 of the FAA for arbitrations that occurred in admiralty ("If the basis ofjurisdiction
be a cause of action otherwise justiciable in admiralty, then.., the party claiming to be
aggrieved may begin his proceeding hereunder by libel and seizure of the vessel.., and the
court shall then have jurisdiction .... ). 9 U.S.C. § 8 (2000).
132 Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874). In this frequently cited
case, Wisconsin law required out-of-state insurance companies to waive their right of
removal to federal court and consent to exclusive state jurisdiction for future lawsuits. A
New York company who consented to state jurisdiction sought federal jurisdiction under the
Judiciary Act of 1789 in a lawsuit filed by a policyholder to recover a property loss.
Reversing the Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling that upheld the state law, the Home
Insurance majority reasoned that a person could not be compelled to waive his right to a
judicial forum. In a passage that had negative implications for predispute arbitration
agreements-but also, did not rule on such a contract-the Court said, "[a]greements in
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void." Id. at
451. The opinion continued:
In a civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration, or
to the decision of a single judge. So he may omit to exercise his right to remove his suit
to a Federal tribunal, as often as he thinks fit, in each recurring case. In these aspects
any citizen may no doubt waive the rights to which he may be entitled. He cannot,
however, bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced,
thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be
presented.
Id.
133 /Id. at 451-52.
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conclude that "[e]very citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country,
and to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford
him. A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial
rights."134
Isolating this excerpt from Home Insurance, one can appreciate why certain
courts resisted arbitration. Nevertheless, recall that Home Insurance did not
apply judicial ouster to a predispute arbitration agreement, but rather, an
agreement to consent to state jurisdiction in lieu of federal court. More
interesting, numerous courts discredited attempts to extend Home Insurance's
theory of judicial ouster to predispute arbitration agreements.
Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District No. 32, Carver
County 35 exemplified courts that carefully researched Scott v. Avery's negative
treatment of arbitration, and contrary to Home Insurance, raised critical questions
about this English precedent:
The historical and only basis for the opinion that executory agreements to
arbitrate all issues to arise under a contract are void, as against public policy, is
open to serious question. There is eminent authority (Lord Campbell, in Scott
v. Avery... ), that the rule was the product of judicial jealousy rather than
judicial reasoning. He said that it arose in the time when 'the emoluments of
the Judges depended mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees.' In those days they
had no fixed salary and so 'there was great competition to get as much as
possible of litigation into Westminster Hall, and a great scramble ... for the
division of the spoil.' In consequence, 'they had great jealousy of
arbitrations .... Therefore they said that the Courts ought not to be ousted of
their jurisdiction, and that it was contrary to the policy of the law to do so.'] 36
To be clear, the Park Construction majority perceived that English courts in
the 1700s protected their jurisdiction against encroachments by arbitration-not
for principles, but for naked self-interest. Once this economic disincentive was
removed, courts ended their jealousy. A dissenter in Park Construction went
further in asserting that Scott v. Avery's theory of judicial ouster never
diminished judicial support for arbitration because of an abiding Anglo-
American norm to allow for privately contracted forms of dispute resolution:
Lord Campbell's assertion appears to be groundless. He does not
substantiate his statement with any evidence or citation. The available evidence
134 Id. at 451.
135 Park Contr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, Carver County, 296 N.W. 475 (Minn.
1941) (citation omitted).
136 Id. at 477.
[Vol. 18:2 20031
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
is against him. In 1648, which was ... over 200 years before the decision in
Scott v. Avery, March stated in his treatise on Slander and
Arbitraments... that the law seemedfavorable to arbitration. Referring to the
act of 1698, Blackstone said that the legislature encouraged arbitration
because of 'the great use of these peaceable and domestic tribunals., 137
Most pre-FAA courts either ignored or greatly minimized Lord Campbell's
well publicized theory of judicial ouster, and were persuaded to follow the
"modem" trend-by this time, in place for centuries !-to enforce predispute
arbitration agreements. While Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania
Coal Co. recognized that "[i]t appears to be well settled by authority that an
agreement to refer all matters of difference or dispute that may arise to
arbitration, will not oust a court of law or equity of jurisdiction,"'' 38 the court
applied this negative doctrine only to a predispute arbitration agreement
"induced by fraud, or overreaching, or entered into unadvisedly through
ignorance, folly, or undue pressure ... .- 139 Otherwise, the court believed that:
[W]hen the parties stand on an equal footing, and intelligently and deliberately,
in making their executory contracts, provide for an amicable adjustment of any
difference that may arise, either by arbitration or otherwise, it is not easy to
assign, at this day, any good reason why the contract should not stand, and the
parties made to abide by it and the judgment of the tribunal of their choice. 1 40
This led to the conclusion that:
Were the question res nova ... a party would not now be permitted, in the
absence of fraud or some peculiar circumstances entitling him to relief, to
repudiate his agreement to submit to arbitration, and seek a remedy at law,
when his adversary had not refused to arbitrate, or in any way obstructed or
hindered the arbitration agreed upon."1 4 1
Numerous courts went further by completely rejecting the ouster doctrine. In
Hood v. Hartshorn,142 Massachusetts's Chief Justice Chapman remarked that
137 Id. at 486 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Justice Peterson continued: "The
enforcement by common-law judges of contracts to arbitrate in the same manner as other
contracts were enforced and of bonds given to secure performance of such contracts is a
complete refutation of Lord Campbell's claim of judicial jealousy." Id.
138 Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Penn. Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250, 258 (1872).
139Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.142 Hood v. Hartshorn, 100 Mass. 117 (1868).
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"there is no policy of law in this Commonwealth adverse to the settlement of
controversies or questions between parties by arbitration .... 143 He added that
"judicial tribunals are provided by the government to enable parties to enforce
their rights when other means fail, but not to hinder them from adjusting their
differences themselves, or by agents of their own selection." 144 In an
employment arbitration case, White v. Middlesex Railroad Co., the court
expressly refused to adopt a per se rule that restated the theory of judicial
ouster. 145 Hurdle v. Stallings broadly approved the use of predispute arbitration
agreements, declaring that "the settlement of controversies by arbitration is
looked on with great favor by the courts." 146
The foregoing historical analysis moderates key claims made by advocates
and critics of mandatory arbitration. As is shown below, arbitration proponents
rely on a passage in the FAA House of Representatives Report that asserts
congressional intent to end judicial hostility to arbitration. Our research shows, to
the contrary, that American courts were not opposed to arbitration, but either
embraced it or placed reasonable limits on its use. We do not know if FAA
supporters in the 1920s relied on faulty research, or used this argument as a straw
man to mobilize support for their legislation. Our study suggests, however, that if
courts today were to follow a completely laissez-faire approach to mandatory
arbitration they would violate two hundred years of common law experience in
which their predecessors used basic contract doctrines to protect against unfair
dealings or unjust outcomes.
Our research also undercuts a current complaint of mandatory arbitration.
Critics believe that courts today are institutionally biased in their preference for
private over public forms of dispute resolution. Furthermore, they perceive
Gilmer and Circuit City as pernicious examples of a new tradition that closes
courthouse doors to hopeful litigants. These shortsighted critics err by treating
Gilmer and Circuit City as innovations. American courts have generally allowed
individuals over the past two centuries to determine their own adjudicatory
method for settling disputes. Critics also overstate the permissive tendencies of
American courts when they are presented with a controversy over a predispute
arbitration agreement. Judges do not rubber-stamp these agreements. Since the
early 1800s, they have enforced minimum due process standards regarding the
selection of arbitrators and the exercise of arbitral powers. Moreover, courts have
143 Id. at 122.
144 Id.
145 White v. Middlesex R.R. Co., 135 Mass. 216, 220 (1883).
146 Hurdle v. Stallings, 13 S.E. 720, 721 (N.C. 1891); see also Lusk v. Clayton, 70N.C.
184 (1874) (North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the authority of arbitrators to enter into
awards).
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understood that an arbitrator could render an award that conflicts with law or
public policy, and have guarded against this encroachment.
III. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND PREDISPUTE EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Judicial oversight of employment arbitration takes place under conflicting
statutory regimes. Federal discrimination laws, for example, provide for federal
jurisdiction of claims, and set forth judicial powers and procedures. 147 Other
employment laws-for instance, the False Claims Act, a whistleblower
protection law-provide even more detailed procedures and court powers.' 48
This grant of judicial powers is so specific that one may infer that private
adjudication of these disputes is foreclosed.
As this Part explains, the FAA sets up a contrary regime, one in which courts
are to exercise very limited powers to review private adjudication of employment
claims. By providing federal courts jurisdiction to enforce arbitration agreements,
it precludes lawsuits that would otherwise occur in federal courts and refers these
disputes to a private forum. In short, the FAA is in tension, to varying degrees,
with the jurisdictional provisions of federal employment laws. Adding to this
conflict, recent employment discrimination laws provide for federal jurisdiction
147 To illustrate, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes federal courts to
award attorneys' fees to "prevailing parties" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1964).
According to the Supreme Court, Congress granted courts this special power to federal
courts "to facilitate the bringing of discrimination complaints." New York Gaslight Club,
Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980). The "legislative history and purpose of § 706(k)" of
Title VII was to make "clear that one of Congress' primary purposes in enacting the section
was to 'make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit."' Id.
(internal citation omitted).
148 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000) (providing that "[a]n employee may bring an action
in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided in this
subsection"). This provision continues:
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in
any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by
his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the
employee or others in furtherance of an action under this section, including
investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be
filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee
whole. Such relief shall include reinstatement with the same seniority status such
employee would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay,
interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a
result of the discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys 'fees.
Id. (emphasis added).
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to adjudicate claims, while also encouraging the use of ADR methods. 149 When
these laws say they encourage arbitration where appropriate, does this apply to
mandatory arbitration or only voluntary agreements?
Federal courts become involved in employment arbitration disputes when an
individual sues his or her employer. Often, a person is challenging a termination
decision, 150 but the controversy can involve any aspect of the employment
relationship, such as pay or working conditions. In our sample cases, the
employer usually files a motion to compel arbitration of a predispute employment
arbitration agreement. These motions are intended to deny employees a trial on
their legal claims, and substitute private arbitration as an exclusive forum.
The FAA provides federal courts jurisdiction to enforce arbitration
agreements. 151 However, this simple jurisdictional law is plagued by an
interpretive puzzle. On one hand, Congress passed the FAA to promote court
enforcement of arbitration agreements.152 It justified this policy by attacking the
149 See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2000) (as
amended); The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 118,105 Stat. 1081 (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)). Both laws state: "Where appropriate... the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under this chapter." Id. More recent examples of ADR initiatives are The
Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (2000) (authorizing more ADR programs to be
administered by federal courts to alleviate problems with cost and delay); The Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2000); The Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act, enacted in 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 572(a) (2000) (enabling all federal agencies to
implement ADR policies for internal disputes).
150 In our sample, sixty-five percent of cases involved employee terminations.
151 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended
under 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)). The law applies to the following arbitration agreements:
[That] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2, 43 Stat. at 883.
Section 3 provides jurisdiction in "any suit or proceeding.., brought in any of the courts of
the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration ...... 9 U.S.C. § 2, 43 Stat. at 883.
152 The House Report states that Congress intended to place arbitration agreements
"upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs." H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1
(1924).
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perceived jealousy between civil law courts and various arbitration systems. 153
Congress's main concern was with businesses who wanted freedom to enter into
contracts to resolve their commercial disputes privately. 154 Businesses also
wanted access to an economical dispute resolution process, with a public policy
assurance that courts would not later interfere with their private arrangements. 55
Up to this point, there is nothing puzzling about the FAA. The difficulty
begins, however, with Section 1 of the statute-an oddly placed provision that
sets forth exceptions to the law's coverage. Section 1 was a response to labor
union concerns. 156 It excluded "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
153 Our research findings in Part II.C take issue with this key excerpt from the FAA
House Report:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some
centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction,
they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts
were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a
period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was
adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too
strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have
frequently criticised the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which
results from it. The bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be
enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.
Id. at 1-2.
154 See 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) ("It creates no new legislation, grants no new
rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty
contracts." When the bill was introduced in the House, its sponsor, Rep. Mills, explained
that it "provides that where there are commercial contracts and there is disagreement under
the contract, the court can [en]force an arbitration agreement in the same way as other
portions of the contract." 65 CONG. REC. at 11,080 (emphasis added)).
155 See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924). Congress believed the procedural
simplicity of arbitration would "reduc[e] technicality, delay, and [keep] expense to a
minimum and at the same time safeguard the rights of the parties." Id. at 2; see also S. REP.
No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (stating that the FAA, by avoiding "the delay and expense of
litigation," would appeal "to big business and little business.., corporate interests [and] ...
individuals").
156 Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover "suggested that '[i]f objection appears to
the inclusion of workers' contracts in the law's scheme, it might be well amended by stating
"but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.' $$
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v..Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 127 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted) (alteration in original). Labor union objections were traced to the president
of the International Seamen's Union of America, who addressed the matter at the 1926
annual convention of his union:
[T]his bill provides for reintroduction of forced or involuntary labor, if the freeman
through his necessities shall be induced to sign. Will such contracts be signed? Esau
279
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workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," thereby preserving their
access to courts and protecting them from submitting to compulsory arbitration.
The puzzle is, what did Congress mean by the expression "any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce?"
This enigma is rooted in congressional understanding of compulsory forms
of arbitration agreements. Congress believed that businesses were able to enter
these contracts more or less voluntarily, but some legislators questioned even this
point.157 As for employees, it was understood that workers had no choice to
decline or bargain over an arbitration agreement imposed by their employer. 158
The puzzle, then, is whether Congress intended the FAA to be only a commercial
dispute resolution law, or that and also a law for workplace dispute resolution.
Judging from this review of legislative history, which makes explicit references
to commercial arbitration, it appears that Congress intended only the former.
Other clear evidence shows that lawmakers wanted businesses who preferred a
private method to be able to work out their own disputes without engaging in
expensive and time-consuming lawsuits. 159
agreed, because he was hungry. It was the desire to live that caused slavery to begin and
continue. With the growing hunger in modem society, there will be but few that will be
able to resist. The personal hunger of the seaman, and the hunger of the wife and
children of the railroad man will surely tempt them to sign, and so with sundry other
workers in 'Interstate and Foreign Commerce.'
Id. at 126-27 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
157 Even though there was no serious debate that businesses voluntarily entered into
predispute arbitration agreements, Senator Walsh noted that some businesses did not have
real power to negotiate contract terms:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered
into are really not [voluntary] things at all. Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in
it. You can take that or you can leave it. The agent has no power at all to decide it.
Either you can make that contract or you can not make any contract.
Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement to Senator Walsh of Montana).
158 Id. noting that
It is the same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says, 'These are our
terms. All right, take it or leave it.' Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to
sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by the court, and has to
have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.
159 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924). Congress believed the procedural simplicity of
arbitration would "reduc[e] technicality, delay, and [keep] expense to a minimum and at the
same time safeguard the rights of the parties." Id. at 2; see also S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3
(1924) (stating that the FAA, by avoiding "the delay and expense of litigation," would appeal
"to big business and little business... corporate interests [and] ... individuals").
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Thus, the FAA broadly directed courts to enforce rulings from these
forums. 160 Use of the FAA expanded in the 1940s and 1950s to enforce a
different kind of employment arbitration award-those involving the voluntary
submission of a dispute by labor unions and employers. 61 The Supreme Court
ended this role for the statute, however, in Lincoln Mills. 162
The FAA reemerged as a workplace dispute resolution law in 1991. In
Gilmer,163 a securities broker sued his employer for age discrimination. The
Supreme Court ruled that the FAA applied to a predispute arbitration agreement
that Gilmer signed. This meant that he was compelled to arbitrate his dispute. 164
In two respects, Gilmer created uncertainty for lower courts. Since the
160 After providing federal courts jurisdiction to hear controversies over arbitration
agreements, the FAA states that a court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). Following the arbitration, the FAA prescribes:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration ... then at any time within one
year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so
specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an
order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10
and 11 of this title.
9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
The Act further provides very narrow grounds for a court to deny enforcement to an
award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;(#2) where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;(#3) where
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or(#4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
161 See generally Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and
the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Paul J. Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953); Donald
Wollett & Harry H. Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L.
REV. 445 (1955).
162 Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57
(1957). The Court ruled that federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements
under the NLRA, including arbitration provisions, arises under Section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, and not the FAA. Id.
163 Gilmer v. Insterstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
164 Id. at 26.
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plaintiff's employment as a stock broker was terminated, allegedly because of his
age, 165 his discrimination claim was like those presented in ADEA (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act) lawsuits. Importantly, Gilmer did not have
an employment arbitration agreement, but a broker agreement imposed by the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 166 For many years, the
NASD required all brokers under its purview to sign these agreements as a
condition of affiliation. When the Court decided Gilmer, very few NASD
arbitrations involved employment discrimination. 167 Most dealt with customer
complaints against dealers, which in turn implicated the supervisory functions of
a broker's employer and the NASD. 168 So, one uncertainty was whether lower
courts would distinguish more conventional types of employment agreements
from Gilmer by regarding the Supreme Court decision as a commercial
arbitration precedent. Second, Gilmer resulted in a narrow ruling and reserved
the much broader issue of interpreting Section 1 of the FAA, 169 while its tone
and dicta were expansive and very favorable to mandatory arbitration of
employment disputes.
American employers paid more attention to Gilmer's pro-arbitration signal
than its narrow ruling. They perceived strong encouragement to emulate the
NASD model for resolving workplace disputes. 170 Much in Justice White's
majority opinion spurred them to embrace mandatory arbitration. First, he
165 Id. at 23.
166 See id. at 25.
167 See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN
DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES (March 30, 1994) GAO/HEHS 94-17, 1994 WL 836270. The
GAO study reported that only eighteen employment discrimination arbitrations occurred in
the securities industry between August 1990 and December 1992.
168 Id. (reporting that among the NASD, 1,110 arbitrations that took place in calendar
year 1991 and 1992, most were customer complaints against brokers).
169 Section 1 of the FAA excludes coverage of "seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). By
treating Gilmer's agreement as a broker rather than employment contract, the Gilmer
majority avoided the issue of whether this arbitration agreement was excluded under Section
1. It then reserved the much more important issue of whether employment contracts in
general are excluded by this provision in the FAA. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2 ("[I]t
would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion because the arbitration
clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment.").
170 See Bickner, supra note 12, at 78 (reporting a massive increase in the use of
arbitration in nonunion workplaces following the Supreme Court's Gilmer decision in 1991);
See also Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as Alternative
to Litigation, Survey Says, DAILY LAB. REPT., No. 93 (May 14, 1997), at A-4 (surveying 530
Fortune 1000 companies, this study found that 79 percent of employers use arbitration).
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emphatically rejected Gilmer's argument that an individual cannot be compelled
in an arbitration agreement to waive access to a court. 171 Congress, he reasoned,
did not preclude this type of waiver when it passed the ADEA. 172
He also dismissed several public policy arguments advanced by Gilmer,
specifically, that a private proceeding would deprive employees of a judicial
forum, 17 3 thwart the ADEA's policy of eradicating age discrimination, 174 and
undermine the role of the EEOC. 175 Justice White observed that "[b]y agreeing
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than ajudicial, forum."' 7 6 Arbitration was an acceptable substitute for litigation
to "further broader social purposes" of employment discrimination laws. 177
Finally, he did not "perceive any inherent inconsistency" between the
EEOC's role in administering discrimination policies and judicial enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. 178 His opinion emphasized
that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent function."' 179
These expansive policy pronouncements would have sufficed to send a
strong arbitration signal to employers, but this opinion added more by denying
Gilmer's challenge to the fairness of mandatory arbitration procedures:
Such generalized attacks on arbitration 'res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-
be complainants,' and as such, they are 'far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
171 The majority based this conclusion on Supreme Court precedents involving
mandatory arbitration of legal claims arising under various federal statutes. Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 26.
172 The majority said, "we note that the burden is on Gilmer to show that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA claims." Id. The Court
ultimately concluded that Gilmer failed to prove that Congress intended to prohibit the
arbitration of these claims. Id. at 35.
173 Id. at 29.
17 4 Id. at 27.
175 Id. at 28.
176 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
177 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
178 Id. at 27.
179 Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
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disputes.' 180
Continuing, the opinion dismissed specific procedural concerns about
mandatory arbitration. 181
This sweeping decision set two forces in motion. Many employers
inaugurated employment arbitration programs. 182 The scale of this development
is revealed in an American Arbitration Association report stating that "more
than 500 employers and five million employees" were covered by its
employment arbitration programs in 2000.183 This single provider of arbitration
services rivaled smaller federal circuits by substituting its arbitrators and private
procedures for judges and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, courts
rapidly extended Gilmer on two broad fronts: (1) to arbitration agreements
involving occupations outside the securities industry, and (2) to federal
employment statutes other than the ADEA. 184 These decisions amplified
180 Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 481 (1989)). The Court also observed that the FAA was enacted to curb judicial
resistance to arbitration: "Its purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by
American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts." Id. at 24.
181 Although Gilmer contended that mandatory arbitration panels would be biased in
favor of employers, the majority said "we decline to indulge the presumption that the parties
and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent,
conscientious and impartial arbitrators." Id. at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634).
Gilmer objected to the fact that discovery is more limited in arbitration than in federal courts,
but again, the majority dismissed this concern, noting that "[i]t is unlikely, however, that age
discrimination claims require more extensive discovery than other claims that we have found
to be arbitrable, such as RICO and antitrust claims." Id. at 31. The majority also rejected
concerns that NASD arbitrators often fail to issue written opinions, thus depriving Gilmer
and similarly situated complainants an opportunity for effective appellate review. Gilmer
noted that this also stifles development of the law. Id. Finally, Gilmer complained that his
agreement resulted from unequal bargaining power. The Court showed little sympathy for
this argument, concluding that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power.., is not a sufficient
reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context."
Id. at 33.
182 See Bickner, supra note 12, at 78.
183 American Arbitration Association, Proud Past, Bold Future, 2000 ANN. REP. 28
(2001). The AAA is a leading ADR service provider in this market.
184 See McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998); O'Neil v.
Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109
F.3d 354, 356-58 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Bums Int'l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470-72
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1996);
and Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 596-601 (6th Cir. 1995).
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Gilmer's loud and clear arbitration signal to employers.
Only the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defied this trend. 185 In Craft v.
Campbell Soup Co., 186 this court struck at the heart of Gilmer. Just as Gilmer
made policy pronouncements far beyond the disputed legal issue, Craft's
majority stretched facts to achieve its own purpose. 187 Its focus was the elastic
185 The Ninth Circuit first limited Gilmer in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144
F.3d 1182, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1998). The court determined that Congress intended, in passing
the Civil Right Act of 1991, to preclude an employee's prospective waiver of his or her right
to a judicial forum for Title VII claims. Giving a narrow interpretation to provisions in the
1991 law that encouraged arbitration "where appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law," the court concluded that Congress intended to prevent an employee from waiving his or
her Title VII rights before a dispute arose. Id. Shortly after data collection ended for this
Article, the Ninth Circuit declared that "[I]n Circuit City, the Supreme Court so directly
undermined the reasoning behind Duffield, that we conclude it has lost its status as valid
precedent." E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir.
2002). However, even though Duffield is no longer good law in the Ninth Circuit, its impact
on cases in this study cannot be overlooked.
186 Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
187 The plaintiff, an employee who was represented by a union, filed a grievance and a
lawsuit respectively alleging contractual and statutory violations of non-discrimination
duties. Id. at 1084. At the labor-management arbitration, "the arbitrator decided that Craft's
claims under the [labor agreement] were so intertwined [with state and federal discrimination
laws] that the Union had to submit the entire grievance to arbitration or withdraw it." Id. at
n.2. After Craft pursued the matter in federal district court, Campbell Soup was granted
summary judgment on Craft's state law claims; but the court also held that arbitration of
Craft's Title VII claims could not be compelled. Thus, Campbell Soup was not allowed to
block Craft's race discrimination lawsuit. Id. at 1094. By the time the Ninth Circuit decided
the employer's appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court had decided Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79 (1998). There, the Supreme Court declined to consider the
applicability of the FAA in a case that presented the question whether a general arbitration
clause in a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) requires an employee to use the
arbitration procedure for an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Instead, the Wright Court ruled that an employee is entitled to arbitrate and separately litigate
a discrimination claim because contract and statutory rights are analytically distinct. Id. This
reaffirmed the Court's treatment of arbitration arising under collective bargaining agreements
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); McDonaldv. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984);
and Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
If it preferred less controversy, the Ninth Circuit could have created the same outcome
for Craft by treating him under Gardner-Denver and its progeny. This more cautious
approach would have entailed the court exercising its jurisdiction under Section 301 of the
LMRA. Instead, the Ninth Circuit "assume[d] that Campbell Soup's motion for summary
judgment was a de facto petition under 9 U.S.C. § 4 [the FAA] for an order to compel
arbitration ." Craft, 177 F.3d at 1084 n.4 (emphasis added). Thus,.the Ninth Circuit stretched
the facts to treat Craft as though he was a nonunion employee who was forced to sign a
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clause in the exclusion section of the FAA---"or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"--that followed the expressly covered
group, "seamen (and) railroad employees."' 188
Craft examined federal regulation of the employment relationship under
Congress's commerce powers when the FAA was enacted. Seeing that Congress
regulated only a handful of employment relationships-those in the maritime and
railroad industries-Craft reasoned that when Congress also excluded
employment contracts of "workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," it
meant to exclude the employment agreements of workers whose industries would
come under federal regulation in the future. 189 Thus, as post-FAA labor and
employment laws-for example, the National Labor Relations Act,' 90 Fair Labor
Standards Act, 191 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 192 and Americans with
Disabilities Act' 93-expanded federal regulation of most private sector
employers, the FAA's employment exclusion grew commensurately. By
interpreting Section l's exclusion clause so broadly, Craft narrowed Gilmer to its
predispute employment arbitration contract, as was the case with Robert Gilmer.
188 Craft, 177 F.3d. at 1085.
189 See id. at 1086, stating:
The FAA, however, is not a modem statute. As noted above, the FAA, including § § 1
and 2, was enacted in 1925, before the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the
meaning of interstate commerce in the 1930s. Thus, to understand whether Congress
intended for the FAA to apply to employment contracts, we need to understand
Congress' commerce power in 1925.
The Ninth Circuit then concluded:
Thus, when Congress drafted the FAA in 1925, the Act did not apply to any labor or
employment contracts (citation omitted).... [I]nterstate commerce at the time the FAA
was enacted was generally understood to be limited to maritime and railroad
transactions. Thus, when Congress excluded employment contracts of maritime and
railroad workers, it resulted in voiding the power to enforce arbitration clauses of most
employment contracts. With the addition of the catch-all phrase 'or any other class of
worker engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,' all employment contracts would
have been excluded from thearbitration enforcement power of the FAA.
Id. at 1087 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp.
117, 123 (N.D. Miss. 1995)).
190 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2001)).
191 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-19 (2001)).
192 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-17 (2001)).
193 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Ch. 225, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101, et. seq. (2001)).
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original work setting-the securities industry.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit decided the broad issue that the Supreme Court
reserved in Gilmer.194 In doing so, it went beyond disagreement with other
circuits. Craft rebelled against Gilmer and effectively condemned mandatory
employment arbitration.195 As a consequence, it set a strong new precedent to
deny enforcement of arbitration clauses, thus clearing the way to litigate a wide
range of employment disputes. 196
The revolt spread to the California state courts. 197 In a key decision,
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,198 the California
Supreme Court held that a mandatory employment arbitration agreement was
unconscionable, 199 violated the state's public policy against employment
discrimination, 200 and unlawfully limited recovery for statutory damages. 201 In
finding that the arbitration procedure was an adhesion contract, the California
Supreme Court contradicted Gilmer's broad approval of this ADR method.202
194 Compare Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2 (stating "it would be inappropriate to address
the scope of the § 1 exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not
contained in a contract of employment"), and Craft, 177 F.3d at 1083-84 ("Ourjurisdiction
therefore hinges on the proper interpretation of [§ 1] of the FAA in relation to employment
contracts, which is a question of first impression in our circuit.").
195 See 1999 Perspectives, 10 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 19, 27 (Jan. 1999)
(offering this strong rebuke: "The appellate court's reasoning on this matter is so obviously
strained and distortive that it nearly defies commentary .... It is now clear that the Ninth
Circuit has drawn the proverbial 'line in the sand. . . . '); Paul J. Dubow, Tweaking
Arbitration-Can the RUAA Fill the Gaps in the FAA?, 9 Bus. L. TODAY (Sept./Oct. 1999)
at 46 (complaining that "[t]he biggest (and perhaps most surprising) encroachment on the
FAA's dominance was made last December by the Ninth Circuit when it decided that the
FAA did not apply to employment contracts."); Beth E. Sullivan, Note, The High Cost of
Efficiency: Mandatory Arbitration in The Securities Industry, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 311,
339 (1999) (adding "[g]iven that the FAA has long been interpreted as being the most
persuasive legal support for mandatory arbitration, the Ninth Circuit's holding can be viewed
as a giant step backwards for alternative dispute resolution ('ADR') proponents").
196 E.g., Circuit City, Inc. v. Banyasz, No. C-01 -3106 WHO, C- 1-3107 WHO, 2001 WL
1218406, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2001); Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. Civ. 01-93-KI,
2001 WL 1105046, at * 3 (D. Or. 2001).
197 E.g., Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft Employees Fed. Credit Union, 83 Cal. Reptr. 2d
763 (Cal. App. 1999), review dismissed by 990 P.2d 504 (Cal. 1999).
198 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
199 Id. at 698.
200 Id. at 680-81.
201 Id. at 683.
202 See id. at 690:
It was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no
opportunity to negotiate .... [T]he economic pressure exerted by employers on all but
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The United States Supreme Court swiftly answered Craft's provocation. By
a *5-4 vote in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 203 it held that the FAA's
exclusion applies only to transportation workers who are employed in interstate
commerce. 204 The majority reasoned that if this exclusion was so broad as to
cover all employment contracts, there would be no point in its specific reference
to maritime and rail workers. 20 5 They also interpreted the FAA's exclusion in
light of its "engaged in commerce" provision.20 6 Finally, in a muted response to
Craft's broadside of the Court's support for mandatory arbitration, Justice
Kennedy blandly answered that a "variable standard for interpreting common,
jurisdictional phrases would contradict our earlier cases and bring instability to
statutory interpretation. '" 207
Circuit City ended serious discussion of whether most individual
employment arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA. However,
this did not flash a constant green light for the enforcement of mandatory
arbitration agreements. Departing from its string of pro-arbitration rulings, the
Court held that the EEOC is not precluded from suing even if an individual
waives her right to sue.208 More significant, as is shown below, federal courts
the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement
stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a
position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement.
203 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
204 See id. at 114-15 (stating that "[t]he wording of § 1 calls for the application of the
maxim ejusdem generis, the statutory canon that '[w]here general words follow specific
words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words"').
205 Id.
206 See id. at 115:
Canons of construction need not be conclusive and are often countered, of course,
by some maxim pointing in a different direction. The application of the rule ejusdem
generis in this case, however, is in full accord with other sound considerations bearing
upon the proper interpretation of the clause. For even if the term 'engaged in
commerce' stood alone in § 1, we would not construe the provision to exclude all
contracts of employment from the FAA. Congress uses different modifiers to the word
'commerce' in the design and enactment of its statutes. The phrase 'affecting
commerce' indicates Congress' intent to regulate to the outer limits of its authority
under the Commerce Clause.
207 Id. at 117.
208 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 291
(2002). The Court considered whether an employee's agreement to arbitrate disputes with his
employer prevented the EEOC from suing the employer on his behalf to obtain victim-
specific relief, such as backpay or reinstatement. The Court concluded that the EEOC was
not prevented from filing suit or seeking any remedy that would otherwise be available. Id.
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continue to deny enforcement to mandatory employment arbitration agreements
when these contracts create forum barriers for employees or otherwise inhibit
pursuit of a claim at arbitration. 209 In short, although it would be reasonable to
suppose that federal courts enforce a high percentage of pre-arbitration
agreements in response to Gilmer and Circuit City, the reality is not so
predictable.
IV. RESEARCH METHODS
The research literature has been dominated by vocal critics of mandatory
arbitration, and a smaller but also strident group of arbitration advocates. Both
sides score points with good arguments. Opponents fault employers for
controlling too much of the arbitration process to their sole advantage. 210 They
contend that structural incentives such as employer selection of neutrals and the
repeat-player phenomenon lead to arbitrator bias.211 Arbitration critics assume
that litigation is better than arbitration for vindicating employee rights.
However, a growing body of empirical evidence challenges these
assumptions. Although the EEOC has initial jurisdiction of most employment
209 See Part VII.
210 E.g., Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment
Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479 (2001) (commercial and
employment arbitrations involve different power relationships); Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem ofParty Autonomy in Dispute Resolution,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000) (current forms of arbitration involve one party who is more
sophisticated than the other in managing the dispute resolution process); Margaret M.
Harding, The Redefinition ofArbitration by Those with Superior Bargaining Power, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 857 (predispute arbitration agreements are distorted by one party seeking
advantage over the other); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals ofEmployment
Discrimination, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395 (1999) (employers adopt mandatory
arbitration to avoid enforcement of Title VII); and Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73
DENY. U. L. REV. 1017, 1036 (1996) (comparing mandatory contracts for employment
arbitration to "yellow dog" contracts of a century ago that compelled employees to agree not
to join or form a union).
211 See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesion Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics on Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
223, 258-59 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
(Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake ofGilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591, 619-24 (1997) (discussing the
advantages repeat-player employers have when negotiating contracts and later participating
in dispute resolution with one-time player employees); Mark Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95
(1974).
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discrimination claims, it sues on less than one percent of all complaints. 212 Thus,
every year tens of thousands of complaints exit this process with only a right-to-
sue letter.213 But plaintiff lawyers take just five percent of these employment
discrimination complaints. 214 For the few complainants who succeed in finding
legal representation, their next access problem is the congestion of court
dockets. 215 Then, assuming this plaintiff group has the same success as other
212 See "EEOC Enforcement Statistics and Litigation" for the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, available at www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2002) (noting that the agency received between 72,000 and 91,000 complaints in
recent years, but sued on only a tiny fraction of these complaints). Compare "Charge
Statistics," id. at 2 (showing that the agency handled 72,302 complaints in 1992; 87,942
complaints in 1993; 91,189 complaints in 1994; 87,529 complaints in 1995; 77,990
complaints in 1996; 80,680 complaints in 1997; 79,591 complaints in 1998; 77,444
complaints in 1999; 79,896 complaints in 2000; and 80,840 complaints in 2001), with
"Litigation Statistics," id. at 15 (showing that the agency filed 447 lawsuits in 1992; 481
lawsuits in 1993; 425 lawsuits in 1994; 373 lawsuits in 1995; 193 lawsuits in 1996; 338
lawsuits in 1997; 405 lawsuits in 1998; 465 lawsuits in 1999; 329 lawsuits in 2000; and 431
lawsuits in 2001).
213 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b)(1):
Where the Commission has found reasonable cause to believe that Title VII or the
ADA has been violated, has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance ... and where
the Commission has decided not to bring a civil action against the respondent, it will
issue a notice of right to sue on the charge ....
214 A survey of attorneys who represent plaintiffs in employment discrimination
disputes found that respondents accepted five percent of the cases in which their legal
services were requested. See Howard, supra note 3, at 44.
215 See Sharon E. Grubin & John M. Walker, Jr., Report of the Second Circuit Task
Force on Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 11,
87-88. "[S]ome judges surveyed expressed their belief that the proliferation of small cases
involving individual claimants, including employment discrimination cases, clog the federal
courts and divert the attention ofjudges away from larger, more significant civil cases." Id.
at 153. This judicial report cautioned that "these cases draw heavily on the time of the
judiciary. From 1970 to 1989, the number of employment discrimination cases filed in
federal courts increased by 2166%, as compared with a 125% increase in the overall civil
caseload." Id. at n.153.
Another source of pertinent statistics is the annual report of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts. Trends for 1993-1997 appear in the 1997 Annual Report of the
Director, Table C-2A (Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit, 1993 Through 1997, at 2,
under "Civil Rights" heading), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialbusiness/
c2asep97.pdf (noting that lawsuits filed in federal courts varied from 12,962 in 1993; 15,965
in 1994; 19,059 in 1995; 23,152 in 1996; 23,796 in 1997). The most recent reporting appears
in the 2001 Annual Report of the Director, Table C-2A (Cases Commenced, by Nature of
Suit, 1997 Through 2001 at 2, under "Civil Rights" heading), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/appendices/c02asep01.pdf, showing that lawsuits filed
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civil complainants, less than five percent have their case go to trial and result in a
verdict.216 A typical employment lawsuit takes more than two years to reach this
terminal point, and costs the parties over $50,000.217 Even then, federal appeals
courts reverse forty-four percent of cases won by employees. 218 In contrast,
complainants in a study of American Arbitration Association cases from 1993-
1995 won sixty-three percent of their cases.219
While advocacy articles and position papers dominate the current debate
over mandatory arbitration, there is a need for more empirical research. Professor
Samuel Estreicher set the tone for this research:
in federal courts ranged from 23,735 in 1998; 22,490 in 1999; 21,032 in 2000; to in 2001,
21,157.
216 See Gauvey, supra note 3, at 41 (reporting that the rate of civil cases that go to trial
in federal courts has steadily declined (8.4 % in 1975, 4.7 % in 1985, 3.5 % in 1995, and
2.3 % as of June 30, 2000)); see also Marika Litras, Bureau of Justice Statistics Report on
Civil Rights, Complaints Filed in US. District Courts, DAILY LAB. REP., No. 14 (Jan. 20,
2000), at E-10, for a study of employment discrimination lawsuits in the federal courts
finding that the proportion disposed of by trial declined from nine percent in 1990 to five
percent in 1998. This study also found that the median time for processing an employment
discrimination case from filing to verdict was eighteen months in 1998. Id.
217 See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 552 (4th Cir.
2001): "[T]he arbitration of disputes enables parties to avoid the costs associated with
pursuing a judicial resolution of their grievances. By one estimate, litigating a typical
employment dispute costs at least $50,000 and takes two and one-half years to resolve." See
also Scheehle v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Arizona, 257 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.
2001) for an emerging trend that may promote wider accessibility to low-cost arbitration.
The Ninth Circuit found no violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause in Arizona
state and county court arbitration rules that require attorneys to serve as arbitrators in civil
cases. Id. at 1085. Attorneys are required to hear cases two days a year, with their pay capped
at $75 per day. Id. at 1084.
218 See Jess Bravin, US. Courts Are Tough on Job-Bias Suits, WALL ST. J., July 16,
2001, at A2. After analyzing nine years of federal trial statistics, Professors Stewart J.
Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg concluded that federal appeals courts are less sympathetic
to workers who allege job discrimination than they are to almost any other type of plaintiff.
Appeals courts reversed victories for plaintiffs in 44 percent of cases, compared to a
plaintiff-win reversal rate of only 33 percent for defendants who appealed their losses.
Moreover, employee job-bias suits were less likely than other types of suits to win at trial.
About 30 percent of the 7575 job-bias suits that were tried resulted in a win for the
employee, compared to a plaintiff win rate of 43 percent in all 57,878 civil trials. The
authors concluded that "appellate courts have a double standard ... harshly scrutinizing
employee victories at trial while gazing benignly" when an employer wins. Their study used
data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and included lawsuits brought under
federal discrimination laws (e.g., the ADEA, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the
ADA).
219 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 213 (1997).
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[A]rbitration of employment disputes should be encouraged as an
alternative, supplementary mechanism-in addition to administrative agencies
and courts-for resolving claims arising under public laws as well as contracts.
It is an alternative that offers the promise of a less expensive, more expeditious,
less draining and divisive process, and yet still effective remedy. Private
arbitration will never, and should not, entirely supplant agency or court
adjudication. But if properly designed, private arbitration can complement
public enforcement and, at the same time, satisfy the public interest objectives
of the various statutes governing the employment relationship.220
Richard Bales, who produced a case study of a model employment
arbitration system, concluded that if this ADR method is designed and
implemented carefully, it can benefit all disputants.2 2
We join this empirical inquiry by questioning the widely held assumption
that federal courts broadly implement Gilmer's and Circuit City's strong
arbitration signals. Since these decisions announce a clear and dominant public
policy to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements, one would reasonably expect
a very high and uniform percentage of FAA lawsuits across the country to result
in court orders enforcing these contracts-thereby diverting disputes from
litigation.
Although this reasoning is logical, on closer inspection it is questionable for
several cogent reasons. The complainants in Gilmer and Circuit City were
covered by arbitration policies that were carefully designed. In Gilmer, the
220 Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment, 72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1349 (1997).
221 See RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW COMPULSORY ARBITRATION:
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 169 (1997), examining a progressive arbitration
system at Brown & Root, a nonunion construction company with 30,000 employees:
Compulsory employment arbitration offers tremendous benefits to both employers
and employees. It can reduce significantly the costs and time involved in resolving
disputes. It also provides a forum for adjudicating grievances to employees currently
shut out of the litigation system. Finally, it presents an opportunity for parties to resolve
their differences in a way that promotes, rather than discourages, maintaining the
employment relationship. ...
Employment arbitration is not a panacea, however, for disputes arising in the
nonunionized workplace. The dangers of employer abuse require courts to be
vigilant in ensuring that arbitration agreements do not become a vehicle for
eliminating employees' legal protections. Nonetheless, given the litigation system's
current inability to provide any meaningful forum to so many employees who feel
they have suffered legal wrongs in the workplace, compulsory arbitration, properly
implemented, can be a significant improvement over litigation.
Id.
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arbitration policy and procedures had been in place for over a century222 and
applied in thousands of disputes. 223 Although both systems are maligned, one of
their best features is responsiveness to criticism. The NASD system is no longer
mandatory, 224 and Circuit City revised its policy to allow individuals to opt-out
of the arbitration system.225 These dispute resolution programs are not free of
any more objectionable features, but they are evolving to accommodate employee
preferences.
However, as cases from the database we compiled illustrate, mandatory
arbitration takes many forms. This implies that Gilmer and Circuit City are more
distinguishable on their facts than is widely assumed. More to the point, some
employers overreach in their ADR practices. For example, a janitorial firm
implemented an arbitration program that required a low-wage worker to pre-pay
several thousand dollars in forum fees.226 An airport security company had an
arbitration program that created cost barriers for an hourly employee. 227
In short, mandatory arbitration is more varied than critics or proponents
acknowledge. Some systems strive to be fair in substance and form by replicating
222 See GAO, supra note 167 (recalling that in 1872, the New York Stock Exchange
became the first securities exchange to provide arbitration as an alternative to litigation in
resolving disputes).
223 See id. The GAO Report noted that thirty-four discrimination complaints were filed
at NYSE between January 1990 and December 1992, from which eighteen resulted in
arbitration. Yet, during calendar years 1991 and 1992, NYSE arbitrated a total of 1,110
cases. Among these, 798 involved customer complaints, and 312 were employment cases
that did not have a discrimination element (e.g., a pay dispute).
224 Recently, the NASD voluntarily curtailed the use of compulsory employment
arbitration. The Securities and Exchange Commission, on June 29, 1998, approved a
proposed rule change offered by the broker group that abolished mandatory arbitration of
statutory employment discrimination claims. See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule
Change Relating to the Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, 63 Fed.Reg.
35,299, 35,303 (June 29, 1998) (rule became effective on Jan 1, 1999). In a separate action,
on December 29, 1998, the SEC amended NYSE Rules 347 and 600 "to exclude claims of
employment discrimination, including sexual harassment, in violation of a statute from
arbitration unless the parties have agreed to arbitrate the claim after it has arisen." See SEC
Release No. 34-40858, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. Relating to Arbitration Rules (January 7, 1999) 64 FR 1051-01, 1999 WL
3315 (F.R.).
225 See Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. SACV 00-763 AHS (EEX), 2001 WL
935317 (C.D. Cal. March 28,2001); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1279
(M.D. Ala. 2000); and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. E.E.O.C, 1998 WL 743937 (E.D. Va. Oct.
1, 1998).
226 See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999).
227 See Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Serv., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
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outcomes that would occur in court.228 Yet others are so biased as to be judged
as "egregiously unfair. '229 Professor Martin Malin astutely noted that Gilmer and
its progeny created numerous "fallout" issues that are now occupying many
lower courts, such as repeat-player bias, discovery, filing deadlines, remedies,
and cost allocation. 230 His point was that Gilmer approved a wide-ranging
dispute resolution system without defining due process safeguards.
Our research provides statistical evidence of how courts are working through
these unsettled issues. Making extensive use of Westlaw's online service, we
researched all federal court decisions that dealt with mandatory employment
arbitration. To generate our sample, we applied the following criteria:
*We used only federal court decisions. Thus, a large number of state court
decisions on this subject were excluded. 231
eThe sample included only decisions involving predispute arbitration
228 See Susanne Craig, Waddell & Reed Ordered to Pay Most ofDamages, WALL ST. J.,
June 10, 2002, at C16 (reporting that a New York court confirmed most of a record $27.6
million arbitration award against Waddell & Reed Financial Inc, a mutual fund company.
The company was assessed this punitive award by an NASD panel of arbitrators for
smearing a broker's reputation before his customers as an outgrowth of an employment
dispute.).
229 See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999). The court
refused to enforce a Gilmer-type employment arbitration agreement because the dispute
resolution system imposed on the complainant by Hooters was "egregiously unfair." Id. at
938. The court reasoned: "We hold that the promulgation of so many biased rules-
especially the scheme whereby one party to the proceeding so controls the arbitral panel-
breaches the contract entered into by the parties.... By creating a sham system unworthy
even of the name of arbitration, Hooters completely failed in performing its contractual
duty." Id. at 940.
230 Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice But By How Much? Questions GilmerDidNot
Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 589, 592 (2001).
231 E.g., Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 749 A.2d 405 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000); Bryant v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 595 N.W. 2d 482 (Iowa 1999);
Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 515 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); Kindred v. Second Judicial
Dist. Ct. ex rel. County of Washoe, 996 P.2d 903 (Nev. 2000); Skewes v. Shearson Lehman
Bros., 829 P.2d 874 (Kan. 1992); Freeman v. Minolta Bus. Sys., Inc., 699 So. 2d 1182 (La.
Ct. App. 1997); Gunby v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 971 S.W.2d 7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1997); Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); Lee v.
Tech. Integration Group, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Spellman v. Sec.,
Annuities & Ins. Serv., Inc., 8 Cal. App. 4th 452 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Rembert v. Ryan's
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 235 Mich. Ct. App. 118 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Rushton v.
Meijer, Inc. (On Remand), 225 Mich. App. 156 (1997); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d 838 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
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agreements with individual employees. 232 This excluded many employment
discrimination claims asserted by union-represented employees in which the
employer contended that these claims should be resolved at arbitration. 233 This
approach reflects the Supreme Court's repeated statement that unionized
employees may pursue employment claims in arbitration and in court.234 Since
these employees have "two bites at the apple," they do not face the same
dilemma of nonunion employees who are compelled to arbitrate their claims. For
nonunion workers, court is not an option unless a judge rules otherwise in these
FAA cases.
* For a case to be included, a party to a predispute agreement had to oppose
arbitration. If an employee voluntarily proceeded to arbitration, and also accepted
the outcome of that proceeding, no FAA controversy occurred. 235 While over
ninety-five percent of our sample consists of cases involving an employee's
initial resistance to arbitration, a few had employees submit their dispute to
arbitration and later challenge the arbitrator's award (i.e., ruling). The latter is
also an emerging type of challenge to mandatory arbitration. 236
e Cases that occurred before Gilmer were included as long as they involved a
predispute mandatory arbitration agreement. Using Gilmer as a cutoff would be
arbitrary since this was not the first Supreme Court decision to deal with
individual employment arbitration. 237 Two small discoveries were made by
keeping the time frame open. First, mandatory employment arbitration has a
232 An unusual case in the sample involved a union-represented employee. In Nelson v.
Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997), a worker who received a
kidney transplant claimed that his employer violated his ADA rights. The union did not
grieve the matter, believing it should be handled as a lawsuit. The employer sued to compel
arbitration, but notably the basis for this employer motion was an individual agreement-
apart from the collective bargaining agreement-to arbitrate discrimination claims. Thus,
Nelson was like a nonunion employee who signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. We
therefore included this case in the sample.
233 E.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
234 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974).
235 See Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) for
another close case in the sample. Here, the plaintiff voluntarily proceeded to arbitrate his
claim, without litigating the mandatory arbitration agreement, until a high down-payment
requirement prompted him to contest the enforceability of this contract. Id. at 1232.
236 See generally Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of
Public Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 19 (2001). These cases included Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d
1456 (1lth Cir. 1997); LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 2 (D.C.
2000); Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
237 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 199 (1956).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
longer history than is recognized. 238 Also, in a few cases an employee moved to
compel arbitration, after the employer tried to resist its own mandatory
arbitration procedures by suing.239
* Cases involving public-sector employment were included, although they
were rare. Boyd v. Town of Hayneville is an example. 240 An African-American
police chief sued after his governmental employer dismissed him.241 Like the
private sector employees in the sample, Boyd was compelled to sign a predispute
arbitration agreement. 242
The sample was generated by using two case finding methods in Westlaw®'s
online research service. We began with Gilmer, Circuit City, and Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,243 and used the "Table of Authorities"
and "KeyCite" features to identify previous and subsequent cases associated with
these milestones. Other decisions were disregarded because the litigants involved
a union, or one corporation suing another, or irrelevant procedural issues.
As cases were included in the sample, they were listed in a roster. 244 The
multi-tasking ability of computers simplified this research. As a potential new
case was identified during online research, it was checked against a growing
roster of data-coded cases on a simultaneously running word processing program.
This ensured unduplicated additions to the sample. By June 1, 2002, this
methodology produced 396 cases.
We extracted data for seventy-eight variables from each decision. To
summarize the main groupings of these variables, we coded data by (a) year of
decision, (b) type of employment, (c) demographic characteristics of the
employee, (d) type of legal claim asserted by party resisting arbitration (e.g., Title
VII race discrimination), (e) legal argument used to resist arbitration (e.g.,
238 E.g., Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971) was decided twenty years
before the Supreme Court ruled in Gilmer.
239 These cases typically involved an apparently successful stockbroker who accepted
employment with a rival firm, prompting the former employer to seek an injunction,
notwithstanding the contractual requirement to arbitrate employment disputes. E.g., Legg,
Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.D.C. 1972).
240 Boyd v. Town of Hayneville, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
241 Id. at 1274.
242 Id.
243 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). Although Green
Tree involved a mandatory arbitration agreement between a lender and borrower, the issue
was identical to one presented in employment cases: whether the cost-allocation provision in
a mandatory agreement that shifted forum costs to an individual who claimed inability to pay
for arbitration fees abrogated her duty to arbitrate. Since this decision is widely cited by
courts that review employment arbitration agreements, we included it in our search.
244 See infra App. I.
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arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it was an adhesion contract), (f)
party (employee or employer) who prevailed at district and circuit court, (g)
district and circuit court ruling, and (h) length of time to litigate this arbitrability
dispute.
V. RESEARCH FINDINGS: COMPARISON OF PRE-GILMER, POST-
GILMER, AND POST-CIRCUIT CITY DECISIONS
The empirical results presented here answer these questions: (1) Have federal
court rulings to enforce predispute arbitration agreements changed over time?
This question allows us to assess court behavior over three contemporary periods
of Supreme Court regulation. Results for this time analysis are reported in this
Part. (2) Among legal challenges to these agreements, which issues have diverted
cases from arbitration, thereby opening the door to public adjudication? In Part
VI, findings for these legal issues are presented.
To begin, the sample consisted of 396 contemporary federal court decisions.
This total was comprised of 297 district and 99 appellate cases. After an initial
analysis, thirty-three district and three appellate cases were found to be unusable,
yielding samples of 264 district and ninety-six circuit court decisions (Tables 1
and 2, respectively at manuscript pages 301 and 302). Cases were unusable when
they were not published as decisions but summarized in the body of an appellate
opinion without indicating a district court decision date. Thus, these district cases
could not be put in a specific time-frame for analysis. Also, the court ruling
variable for a few district and appeals decisions was unusable because the order
had nothing to do with compelling or denying arbitration (e.g., a decision on
whether to impose sanctions for improper conduct by lawyers).
Tables 1 and 2 subdivide rulings into three critical periods: (a) before Gilmer
(hereafter, pre-Gilmer), (b) after Gilmer and before Circuit City (hereafter, post-
Gilmer), and (c) after Circuit City (hereafter, post-Circuit City).
A. At the district court level, the lowest rate ofjudicial enforcement
of arbitration agreements occurred before Gilmer.
In the pre-Gilmer period (1954-1991), federal district courts enforced only
fifty-one percent of the contested arbitration agreements. Often, the facts and
issues in these cases differed from those after Gilmer. Many were commission or
bonus disputes for stockbrokers. 245 Also, a few cases involved a role reversal.
245 See, e.g., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1978); Muh v. Newberger, Loeb
& Co., 540 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1976); Stokes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
523 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1975); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971); Legg,
Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.D.C. 1992); Fox v. Merrill
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Employers sought to escape their own arbitration agreements in favor of
litigation when an employee quit to join a competitor.246 The employer sued to
restore the former employment relationship, prevent direct competition, or order
the broker not to take clients.247
B. District court enforcement of arbitration agreements substantially
increased in the post-Gilmer period, but appellate court enforcement
dropped sharply.
Unlike pre-Gilmer cases, most of these decisions involved discrimination
claims. Although the observation period was much shorter (1991-2001), there
were many more cases (among district decisions, 171 compared to 39, and for
appellate decisions, 61 compared to 20). While the district court enforcement rate
rose from 51 percent to 66 percent, the rate at which courts allowed individuals
to proceed with a lawsuit, instead of arbitration, declined only slightly (e.g.,
district court dismissals of arbitration fell from 31 percent to 28 percent). The
gain in the percentage of cases referred by court order to arbitration came from a
sharp reduction in partial arbitration rulings. Before Gilmer ten percent of district
courts denied enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a federal employment
claim, but compelled arbitration of a pendent state claim. However, these mixed
rulings comprised only one percent of the post-Gilmer sample.
In a remarkable development, appellate courts registered a marked decline in
enforcing arbitration agreements. Employees were ordered to arbitrate their
disputes in only forty-nine percent of these cases. This was an eleven percent
drop compared to pre-Gilmer decisions. In apparent disregard for Gilmer,
appellate courts dismissed almost forty-three percent of employer motions to
compel arbitration. This more than doubled the percentage of cases in which
appellate courts denied enforcement to predispute arbitration agreements.
Lynch & Co. 453 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Lewis v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
246 These cases typically involve an apparently successful stockbroker who accepted
employment with a rival firm, prompting the former employer to seek an injunction,
notwithstanding a mutual promise to arbitrate employment disputes. E.g., id; see also
Downing v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 725 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1984).
247 A recent case involved a different kind of role-reversal. In UBSPaineWebberlnc. v.
Stone, No. CIV. A. 02-471, 2002 WL 377664 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2002), aNASD dealer and
employee submitted an employment dispute to mandatory arbitration. Believing that the
employee's attorney might testify at the arbitration hearing, and citing professional rules that
bar attorneys from testifying in hearings where they are also advocates, UBS PaineWebber
sued to disqualify the attorney. The district court denied this motion, stating that federal
policy significantly limits judicial intrusion in arbitration proceedings.
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C. District court enforcement of arbitration agreements remained
unchanged following Circuit City, while the appellate court
enforcement rate rose sharply.
The post-Circuit City sample was smaller due to the shorter measurement
period (March 22, 2001-June 1, 2002). Still, this sub-sample contained sixty-
nine decisions [fifty-four district and fifteen appellate cases]--over twenty-five
percent of the volume for the entire post-Gilmer period. District court
enforcement was essentially unchanged at sixty-seven percent, while the rate
slightly declined for court decisions that allowed employees to proceed with
lawsuits (dismissal of arbitration fell from twenty-eight percent to twenty-four
percent). In apparent response to Circuit City, appellate courts registered a sharp
gain in enforcement rulings (from forty-nine percent to seventy-three percent).
However, this finding is based on a very small sub-sample of fifteen cases. Three
cases (twenty percent) denied arbitration.
D. Enforcement of arbitration agreements varied widely by federal
circuits after Gilmer, without exhibiting a geographic pattern.
We also analyzed court ruling variation by judicial circuits over the entire
period. There is a distinct limitation in this approach, however. Although this
analysis examined all decisions from 1954-2002, the number of decisions in
some circuits was small. Thus, the following ranking should be viewed with this
serious caveat in mind.
CHART 1: District Court Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration Agreements,
1954-2002
(1) Eighth Circuit (77.8% [14 of 18 cases])
(2) Second Circuit (71.6% [53 of 74 cases])
(3) Third Circuit (69.0% [20 of 29 cases])
(4) Sixth Circuit (68.8% [11 of 16 cases])
(5) Ninth Circuit (68.6% [24 of 35 cases])
(6) D.C. Circuit (66.7% [8 of 12 cases])
(7) Seventh Circuit (65.4% [17 of 26 cases])
(8) Fifth Circuit (64.3% [18 of 28 cases])
(9) Eleventh Circuit (61.1% [11 of 18 cases])
(10) Fourth Circuit (47.4% [9 of 19 cases])
(11) First Circuit (44.4% [5 of 9 cases])
(12) Tenth Circuit (30.8% [4 of 13 cases])
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In presenting the appellate rankings, we note that some differed from district
courts. For example, district courts in the Ninth Circuit ranked in the middle,
enforcing arbitration agreements in 68.6% of their decisions. The appeals court
sharply deviated from this pattern, however, by enforcing only 38.9% of
arbitration agreements. There were also noticeable inconsistencies for district and
appellate courts in the Second Circuit (17.8% difference in rate of enforcing
arbitration agreements), where the largest number of cases occurred; D.C. Circuit
(26.7%difference); Eleventh Circuit (22.2% difference); and Fourth Circuit
(15. 1%difference).
CHART 2: Appellate Court Enforcement of Predispute Arbitration
Agreements, 1955-2002
(1) Eleventh Circuit (83.3%[5 of 6 cases])
(2) Fifth Circuit (75.0% [6 of 8 cases])
(3) Eighth Circuit (66.7% [6 of 9 cases])
(4) Third Circuit (66.7% [4 of 6 cases])
(5) Fourth Circuit (62.5% [5 of 8 cases])
(6) Sixth Circuit (60.0% [3 of 5 cases])
(7) Seventh Circuit (57.1% [4 of 7 cases])
(8) Second Circuit (53.8% [7 of 13 cases])
(9) First Circuit (50.0% [2 of 4 cases])
(10) D.C. Circuit (40.0% [2 of 5 cases])
(11) Ninth Circuit (38.9% [7 of 18 cases])
(12) Tenth Circuit (25.0% [1 of 4 cases])
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TABLE I
Judicial Enforcement of Mandatory Employment Arbitration Agreements
U.S. District Court Decisions (1954-2002)
Pre-GilmerPost-Gilmer/Post-Circuit City/Pre-Circuit City
(N=39) (N=171L (N=54)
Order Arbitration 20 (51.3%) 113 (66.1%) 36 (66.7%)
Dismiss Arbitration 12 (30.8%) 48 (28.1%) 13 (24.0%)
Mixed Ruling 7 (17.9%) 10 ( 6.1%) 5 (9.1%)
[Component Figures Below]
*Mixed Ruling 1
Dismiss Arbitration of Federal Claim/ 4 (10.2%)
Compel Arbitration of State Claim
2 (1.2%) 1(1.9%)
*Mixed Ruling 2
Dismiss Arbitration of State Claim/ 0
Compel Arbitration of Federal Claim
eMixed Ruling 3
Other Partial Arbitration Ruling 3 (7.7%)
*Mixed Ruling 4
Employer Ordered to Pay Forum 0
Costs While Dispute Is Referred to Arbitration
1 (0.6%) 1(1.9%)
5 (2.9%) 1(1.9%)
2 (1.2%) 2(3.7%)
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TABLE 2
Judicial Enforcement of Mandatory Employment Arbitration Agreements
U.S. Circuit Court Decisions (1955-2002)
Pre-GilmerPost-GilmeriPost-Circuit City/Pre-Circuit City
(N=20) (N=61) (N=15)
Order Arbitration 12 (60.0%) 30 (49.2%) 11 (73.3%)
Dismiss Arbitration 4 (20.0%) 26 (42.6%) 3 (20.0%)
Mixed Ruling 4 (20.0%) 5 (8.1%) 1 (6.7%)
[Component Figures Below]
*Mixed Ruling 1
Dismiss Arbitration of Federal Claim/
Compel Arbitration of State Claim
*Mixed Ruling 2
Dismiss Arbitration of State Claim/
Compel Arbitration of Federal Claim
eMixed Ruling 3
Other Partial Arbitration Ruling
3 (15.0%) 1(1.6%) 0
1(5.0%) 0
*Mixed Ruling 4
Employer Ordered to Pay Forum 0
Costs While Dispute Is Referred to Arbitration
3 (4.9%) 1 (6.7%)
1(1.6%) 0
VI. RESEARCH FINDINGS: COMPARISON OF DECISIONS THAT DENY
ARBITRATION BY LEGAL ISSUE
This Part continues analysis of the three periods that are discussed in Part V.
However, a new dimension is added: the legal issue associated with court orders
to deny enforcement to arbitration agreements. The percentages in Table A and
Table B (infra, manuscript page 310 and 312) were derived from cases in which
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employees persuaded a court not to enforce an arbitration agreement. These
tables report results for district and appellate court decisions, respectively.
A. The two most effective employee issues prior to Gilmer-mandatory
agreements as adhesion contracts and precluded statutory
enforcement of rights-declined in effectiveness after Gilmer, but
remained potent.
In pre-Gilmer district court decisions, the preclusion argument was highly
effective (six of thirteen decisions, or 46.2 percent, denied arbitration when this
argument was raised),2 48 while the adhesion issue was moderately successful for
employees (three of ten, or thirty percent, resulted in an order denying
arbitration).249 These rates fell noticeably in the post-Gilmer period, but did not
entirely lose their potency. Individuals prevailed on a preclusion argument in
eleven of fifty-six decisions (19.6 percent), and in six of thirty-three adhesion
cases (18.2 percent). The decline for the adhesion issue appears to have reflected
the Gilmer majority's admonition that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power...
is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable
in the employment context. '250
Since there are fewer appellate decisions, trends are harder to identify.
However, these cases essentially followed district court tendencies. The statutory
preclusion argument was successful for employees in two of five decisions (forty
percent) before Gilmer and remained effective in the post-Gilmer period (five of
eighteen decisions, or 27.8 percent). However, in contrast to district court results,
adhesion arguments were not successful at the appellate level. None was
successful before Gilmer, and only one in ten favored employees in the post-
Gilmer period.
B. The post-Gilmerperiod marked the emergence ofsuccessful contract-
formation and due process challenges.
After Gilmer, employees raised a cluster of challenges to the process of
forming an arbitration agreement, and to the substantive terms of these contracts.
They also challenged procedural aspects of convening and conducting the
arbitration hearing. To provide useful background for understanding these
results, we note that there is no single legislative or judicial source at the federal
248 For the best example of this kind of argument, see Duffield v. Robertson Stephens &
Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); see also infra note 351 and accompanying text.
249 See infra notes 340-46 and accompanying text.
250 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
level that regulates arbitration proceedings. Perhaps the most comprehensive
treatment of this matter appeared in Judge Harry Edwards? opinion in Cole v.
Burns International Security Services.251 Beginning with the Gilmer principle
that "an employee cannot be required as a condition of employment to waive
access to a neutral forum in which statutory employment discrimination claims
may be heard," 252 he extrapolated the following procedural rights for a valid,
mandatory arbitration agreement. The contract must (1) provide for neutral
arbitrators, (2) allow for more than minimal discovery, (3) require a written
award, (4) afford all the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court,
and (5) protect employees from unreasonable costs.253
For employees, the best argument was that no agreement existed to arbitrate
a dispute. This issue was never litigated before Gilmer, but was presented to
fifty-six district courts in our post-Gilmer sample. Table A shows that the issue
was effective for employees on eighteen occasions (32.1 percent). Coding for this
issue reflected several closely related but distinct arguments. For example, our
results here overlapped with all the adhesion cases, since these contracts are
unenforceable.
In addition, numerous cases considered whether a mandatory arbitration
policy embedded in an employee handbook constituted an enforceable contract.
Where a handbook policy demonstrated a detriment to the employer as well as
the individual, courts found enough consideration to form a contract.254
However, where handbook promises were vague,255 or changeable only by
251 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470-72 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
252 Id. at 1482.
253 Id.
254 E.g., Kreimer v. Delta Faucet Co., No. IP99-1507-C-TG, 2000 WL 962817 (S.D.
Ind. June 2, 2000). The employee challenged the validity of her arbitration agreement
because it was only a policy in a handbook. After the employer sought to enforce this
agreement under the FAA, Kreimer argued that she could not be held to it because the policy
lacked consideration. In rejecting this contention, the court observed: "Delta Faucet's
agreement to pay the expenses and fees of mediation and the entire arbitrator's fee in the
event of arbitration, demonstrate a detriment to Delta Faucet that can constitute
consideration." See also Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that the arbitration clause was separate and distinct from the employee
handbook and constituted an enforceable contract).
255 See Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. N.M. 2001), stating:
[The court forum] to resolve disputes is a fundamental right that may not be
relinquished without consideration. In the case of an arbitration agreement
unsupported by consideration, issues surrounding the method of dispute resolution
must be clear, unequivocal and apply mutually to both sides before that agreement
may be enforced. The alleged arbitration agreement in this case was ambiguous,
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employer prerogative, 256 courts ruled these to be illusory agreements. Similarly,
some courts found that an agreement was unenforceable because the arbitration
procedures were too indefinite-and therefore, illusory.257 Table B shows that
employees were remarkably successful at the appellate level on the issue of
whether an agreement existed, prevailing in nine of fifteen cases (post-Gilmer,
sixty percent).
The waiver issue was another significant development. Barely litigated
before Gilmer, and scarcely successful (see Table A, reporting that only one in
seven decisions favored an employee), this issue enabled employees in seven of
thirty-two post-Gilmer decisions (21.9 percent) to avoid arbitration. This
argument was effective when courts used the knowing and voluntary standard.
This finding may seem to be at odds with Gilmer, insofar as the Court rejected
the plaintiff's waiver argument. 258 Recall, however, that the Court was
influenced by the fact that Gilmer was an experienced businessman. Many cases
in this study presented different fact patterns. Mandatory arbitration quickly
spread in the 1990s beyond the securities industry to a wide variety of
workplaces, including those with Spanish-speaking, 259 low-wage, 260 poorly
educated, 261 and minor workers. 262 Thus, the pattern observed among lower
illusory, not mutual, and unsupported by consideration. For these reasons, the
alleged arbitration agreement is unenforceable. Plaintiff should not be compelled
to arbitrate her claims brought herein.
Id. at 1194.
256 See Trumbull v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 683 (N.D. Ohio 1998),
stating:
To give effect to this language and hold that a valid contract exists would be to
create a contract where only one party is bound. The plaintiff would be bound by all the
terms of the handbook while defendant could simply revoke any term (including the
arbitration clause) whenever it desired.
Id. at 686. The court continued: "plaintiff's signing the 'acknowledgment of receipt of
handbook' ... does nothing to make the handbook an enforceable contract. Additionally,
there is no evidence of consideration for the alleged arbitration agreement." Id.
257 E.g., Pruett v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 3:00-CV-422, 2000 WL 33249826 (E.D.
Tenn. Oct. 30, 2000).
258 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
259 See Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 937 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
260 See Giordano v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., No. Civ. A 99-1271, 2001
WL 484360 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2001) (employee subjected to cost-sharing arrangement
earned $400 per week).
261 E.g., Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (plaintiffs in
sexual harassment suit held only General Equivalency Diplomas).
262 Compare Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 985,997-99
(S.D. Ind. 2001) (explaining that high school-educated employees could not execute a
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courts may not reflect so much disagreement with Gilmer as it does a change in
employees' business sophistication. The waiver issue was even more potent at
the appeals court level, where seven of fourteen cases (see Table B) were decided
in favor of employees in the post-Gilmer period.
The cost-allocation issue also changed after Gilmer. According to Table A
(see "Forum Costs Shifted to Employee"), only one case presented the issue
before 1991, but forty cases were observed in the post-Gilmer period. Eight of
these cases (twenty percent) favored employees. Again, the observed change may
reflect a new wrinkle since Gilmer in predispute employment agreements-
inclusion of an aggressive cost-shifting provision that compelled an employee to
bear some or all of the expense of an arbitration. Table B shows that the issue
was remarkably powerful for employees at appellate courts, where they prevailed
in six often post-Gilmer rulings.
Scope of the arbitration agreement also developed into a moderately fertile
issue for employees. Data-coding of this issue covered several distinct
arguments. In agreements that derived from handbooks, and applied only to
disputes involving arbitration of the employer's rules or policies, some courts
held that the scope of the arbitration contract did not include statutory
discrimination claims. 263 Alternatively, others ruled that the duty to arbitrate was
enforceable only for federal but not state claims. 264 Another scope issue also
overlapped with the doctrines of adhesion and illusory contracts-lack of
bilateral obligations. This occurred in contracts that subjected a comprehensive
list of potential employee legal claims to arbitration, but expressly excluded all
potential employer causes of action from a duty to arbitrate.265 Employees
succeeded on fourteen of sixty-five occasions they raised this type of issue (Table
A, 21.5 percent). Table B indicates that their success rate doubled to 44.4 percent
in eight of eighteen cases at appellate courts.
Adequacy of arbitral remedy was litigated only once before Gilmer.
However, Table A shows that employees raised the issue in ten district cases and
prevailed three times in post-Gilmer decisions. This issue took two distinct
knowing and voluntary waiver), and Sheller by Sheller v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,
957 F. Supp. 150, 153 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (rejecting application of the infancy doctrine, thereby
denying litigation of sexual harassment claim and enforcing mandatory arbitration agreement
entered into by a teenage employee).
263 E.g., Rudolph v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 311, 318 (E.D. Va. 1997).
264 E.g., DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank of N.Y., 807 F. Supp. 947, 953 (W.D.N.Y.
1992) (plaintiff's state claim for punitive damages severed from the other arbitrable claims).
265 Compare Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999)
(denying enforcement to arbitration agreement), with Quinn v. EMC Corp., 109 F. Supp. 2d
681, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (granting enforcement to arbitration agreement).
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forms. Some arbitration agreements expressly limited the arbitrator's remedial
authority, for example, by curtailing statutory damages that the law permits as a
recovery to a successful complainant. 266 Second, some employees challenged the
customary practice of many employment arbitrators to deny attorneys' fees to
prevailing complainants, a tendency that contrasted with the approach taken by
most courts. 2 6 7 Some employees prevailed in the award but owed more to their
attorneys than their damages were worth, and thus gained nothing, from
arbitrating-and winning-a meritorious claim. 268
C. After Gilmer, employees were moderately successful in persuading
courts that their arbitration agreement was excluded under Section 1
of the FAA.
Predictably, the issue reserved in Gilmer-interpretation of the FAA's
residual phrase in the exclusion clause of Section 1B was widely litigated. In
thirty-three district cases, employees prevailed in ten rulings (Table A, 30.3
percent). This statistic is misleading, however, for two reasons. A number of
cases involved close calls about whether certain jobs or occupations that are
directly connected to interstate transportation are so similar to "seamen" and
"railroad employees" as to be excluded under Section 1. These jobs were airline
mechanic,269 technical writer for an airline,270 car rental agent, 271 and police
266 E.g., Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373, 378 (4th Cir. 1998)
(arbitration agreement prevents award of additional damages in a civil rights suit).
267 E.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(plaintiff should have been granted attorney's fees as the prevailing party).
268 See id. at 461. An arbitration panel awarded DeGaetano, a sex discrimination
complainant, $90,355 in damages and interest, equal to one year of pay, but denied her
petition for attorney fees. Id. at 461. While this amount was not reported it was probably
substantial because the hearing phase of her arbitration took ten days. Id. DeGaetano sued to
vacate the fee portion of her award, basing her challenge on Title VII's provision for court
authority to "allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. In ruling for
DeGaetano, the court observed that "[a]lthough not couched in mandatory terms, this statute
establishes a presumptive entitlement to an award of attorney's fees for prevailing parties."
Id. at 462. Concluding that DeGaetano's award must have been based on a finding of
employment discrimination, the court reasoned that she was a prevailing plaintiff under Title
VII and therefore entitled to recover attorney fees. Id. at 462-63.
269 See, e.g., Stanley v. Wings Holdings, Inc., No 3-96-1141, 1997 WL 826175 (D.
Minn. Sept. 23, 1997) (granting enforcement to arbitration agreement).
270 See, e.g., Mason v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. 1:98-CV-1795-TWT, 1998 WL
953741 (N.D. Ga, Nov. 23, 1998) (denying enforcement to arbitration agreement, reasoning
that employee was not contractually engaged in transportation of goods in interstate
commerce).
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officer for a metropolitan railway that crossed state borders. 272 Second, this result
was partly driven by the Ninth Circuit's anomalous ruling in Craft,273 which, in
contrast to all other circuits, construed Section 1 expansively. Ninth Circuit
rulings after Craft excluded a broad range of employment contracts from FAA
coverage.274
D. Following Circuit City, three employee challenges to arbitration
remained effective-whether a contract was formed, or a statute
precluded arbitration, or forum costs were improperly shifted to an
individual-while FAA exclusion challenges lost much of their
potency.
Circuit City did nothing to slow the employee argument that a contract was
unenforceable. In nineteen of these cases, individuals prevailed six times (Table
A, 31.6 percent). By itself, this finding suggests judicial resistance to the pro-
arbitration signal sent in Circuit City. However, on closer inspection, this high
figure mostly reflects poor judgment by certain employers. For example, one
court ruled that an agreement was unenforceable because the employer used
high-pressure tactics to compel employees to sign. 275 The same result was
observed where an employer compelled a fast-food worker with annual earnings
of $7,000 to sign an agreement that was found to be procedurally and
substantively unconscionable. 276
Cost-shifting remained an effective issue for employees, succeeding in five
of twenty-one cases (Table A, "Forum Costs Shifted to Employees," 23.8
percent). Again, however, this reveals more about employer overreaching than
judicial resistance to arbitration. An agreement that required a high school
271 See, e.g., Rudolph v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 311, 314 (E.D. Va.
1997) (denying enforcement to arbitration agreement).
272 See, e.g., Jones v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. Civ. A. 95-2300-
LFO, 1997 WL 198114, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1997) (police officer for transit authority is
not subject to the FAA because her employer was engaged in interstate transportation by
virtue of operating rail lines in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia).
273 Supra notes 186-88.
274 See, e.g., Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 2000) (medical
lab employee is not subject to FAA); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 195 F.3d 1131,
1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (consumer electronics store employee is not subject to FAA); Sussman
v. Lenscrafiers, No. 98-15156, 1999 WL 402446, at *1 (9th Cir. Jun. 11, 1999) (eye-care
employee is not subject to FAA).
275 See Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
276 See Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 778 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
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restaurant worker to pre-pay forum fees of $2,000 as a condition for having an
arbitration was denied enforcement. 27 7 In another case, an arbitration award was
vacated after a local radio announcer was compelled to arbitrate and she was
billed $2,600 in forum fees.278 Still, most courts enforced cost-shifting
agreements, even for day-laborers. 279
The argument that an agreement unlawfully precludes an employee's
statutory rights remained resilient, enabling individuals to avoid arbitration in six
of twenty cases (Table A, post-Circuit City, thirty percent). However, as we
explain in more detail below, these employee victories were limited to cases
arising under the Ninth Circuit's questionable Duffield decision, 280 or a statute
that is very specific in providing federal jurisdiction over whistleblower
claims. 281 Thus, like the preceding categories, the results for this issue give a
misleading impression of its overall potency.
Meanwhile, the direct effect of Circuit City's holding became immediately
evident. Table A indicates that only one in seven cases resulted in a ruling that an
arbitration agreement was excluded under Section 1 of the FAA. Since this
exceptional case involved a worker on a deep sea oil rig in the Gulf Coast, the
ruling conformed to Circuit City's view that the FAA's exclusion only applies to
workers who are like "seamen." 282
E. After Circuit City, new procedural issues shortened filing limits,
unavailability of class actions, andforum inconvenience-emerged as
effective employee challenges to arbitration agreements.
New issues emerged in the jurisprudence of arbitration agreements, but were
derived from too few cases to set a trend. The fact that employees prevailed at
least once on each issue signals a possible breakthrough in their efforts to add
limits to mandatory arbitration. Some cases show that employers write strict time
limits for filing a claim. In two of six cases where these limits were shorter than
277 See Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 985,997 (S.D. Ind.
2001).
278 See Ball v. SFX Broad. Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
279 See Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 628, 645-46 (S.D. W.Va. 2001).
280 See E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir.
2002) ("Since our Duffield decision in 1998, our Sister Circuits as well as the Supreme
Courts of California and Nevada have unanimously repudiated its holding... Duffield, like
Bikini Atoll, now sits ignominiously alone waiting remediation.") (citations omitted);
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
281 See Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
282 See Buckley v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 958,965-66 (S.D. Tex.
2002).
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provided by statute, courts ruled for employees (Table A, 33.3 percent).283 A
different case involved a strange time limit. There, the arbitration agreement
required an employee to give the CEO notice within ten days of filing a claim or
the dispute would be permanently time-barred. In this case of first impression,
the Ninth Circuit denied enforcement of the agreement. 284 Inconvenient venue
for arbitration 285 and unavailability of class actions286 were was also litigated
with some success for employees.
TABLE A
Issues Associated With Court Orders to Deny Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements
U.S. District Court Decisions (1954-2002)
Pre-GilmerPost-Gilmer/Post-Circuit City/Pre-Circuit City
Unlawful Waiver of Right to Sue:
1/7(14.3%) 7/32 (21.9%) 1/11 (9.1%)
Adhesive Arbitration Agreement:
3/10 (30.0%) 6/33 (18.2%) 2/15 (13.3%)
Agreement Unlawfully Precludes Statute:
6/13 (46.2%) 11/56 (19.6%) 6/20 (30.0%)
Dispute Not Within Scope of Agreement:
2/13 (15.4%) 14/65 (21.5%) 2/9 (22.2%)
No Bargaining Over Agreement:
0/3 (0%) 2/6 (33.3%) 0/1 (0%)
No Employee Choice Over Arbitrator:
0 (0%) 3/8 (37.5%) 0 (0%)
Arbitrator Traits (Older White Males):
0 (0%) 1/3 (33.3%) 0 (0%)
283 E.g., Louis v. Geneva Enters., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914, 917 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(sixty-day filing limit in arbitration agreement unlawfully conflicts with three year statute of
limitations for FLSA claims).
284 See Soltani v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1047 (9th Cir.
2001).
285 See Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. CIV. 01-545 (JRTFLN) 2002 WL
100391, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2002).
286 Id. at *6-7.
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Forum Costs Shifted to Employee:
0/1 (0%) 8/40 (20.0%)
No Representation for Employee:
0 (0%) 0 (0%)
No Discovery:
0/1 (0%) 3/6 (50.0%)
No Written Arbitration Decision:
o (0%) 0 (0%)
No Agreement to Arbitrate
0 (0%) 18/56 (32.1%)
Shorter Filing Period Than Law:
0/1 (0%) 2/6 (33.3%)
Unavailability of Class Actions:
0/1 (0%) 1/4 (25.0%)
Inconvenient Forum:
0 (0%) 1/3 (33.3%)
Employer Waived Arbitration by Suing:
0 1/1 (100%) 0 (0%)
Inadequate Remedies in Arbitration:
1/1 (100.0%) 3/10 (30.0%)
Arbitration Process Lasts Too Long:
1/1 (100%) 0 (0%)
Right to Jury Precluded by Arbitration:
1/1 (100.0%) 0/2 (0%)
Meaning of Agreement Obscure:
0 (0%) 0/4 (0%)
5/21 (23.8%)
0/1 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
6/19 (31.6%)
0/3 (0%)
1/1 (100%)
1/3 (33.3%)
Employee Occupation Not Within FAA:
1/5 (20.0%) 10/33 (30.3%) 1/7 (14.3%)
Dispute Not In FAA's Commerce Clause:
0 (0%) 1/3(33.3%) 0 (0%)
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TABLE B
Issues Associated With Court Orders to Deny Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements
U.S. Circuit Court Decisions (1955-2002)
Pre-GilmerPost-Gilmer/Post-Circuit CityiPre-Circuit City
Unlawful Waiver of Right to Sue:
0/2 (0%) 7/14 (50.0%) 1/1 (100%)
Adhesive Arbitration Agreement:
0/4(0%) 1/10 (10.0%) 2/2(100%)
Agreement Unlawfully Precludes Statute:
2/5 (40.0%) 5/18 (27.8%) 0/1 (0%)
Dispute Not Within Scope of Agreement:
1/8 (12.5%) 8/18 (44.4%) 0/3 (0%)
No Bargaining Over Agreement:
0/1 (0%) 1/2 (50.0%) 0 (0%)
No Employee Choice Over Arbitrator:
0 (0%) 1/1 (100%) 0/1 (0%)
Arbitrator Traits (Older White Males):
0 (0%) 1/3 (33.3%) 0 (0%)
Forum Costs Shifted to Employee:
0 (0%) 6/10 (60.0%) 1/3 (33.3%)
Shorter Filing Period Than Law:
0/2(0%) 1/1(100%)
Unavailability of Class Actions:
0/1 (0%) 0/1 (0%)
Inconvenient Forum:
0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Employer Waived Arbitration by Suing:
0/1 (0%)
No Representation for Employee:
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
No Discovery:
0 (0%) 2/3 (66.7%) 0 (0%)
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No Written Arbitration Decision:
0 (0%) 0/1 (0%) 0 (0%)
No Agreement to Arbitrate:
0 (0%) 9/15 (60.0%) 0/2 (0%)
Inadequate Remedies in Arbitration:
0/1 (0%) 2/3 (66.7%) 0/1 (0%)
Arbitration Process Lasts Too Long:
0/1 (0%) 0 (0%)
Right to Jury Precluded by Arbitration:
0/1 (0%) 0/1 (0%) 0 (0%)
Meaning of Agreement Obscure:
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Employee Occupation Not Within FAA:
1/3 (33.3%) 5/11 (45.5%) 2/2(100%)
Dispute Not In FAA's Commerce Clause:
0/2(0%) 1/1 (100%) 0 (0%)
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our historical research and empirical findings shed new light on mandatory
employment arbitration. Courts do not automatically follow the strong and
favorable arbitration signals sent by Gilmer and Circuit City. This is not
surprising considering that the Justices were sharply divided in these
decisions. 287 Gilmer's pronouncement to lower courts that there is a "liberal
policy favoring [enforcement of] arbitration agreements" 288 has confronted the
reality that this ADR method requires considerable regulation. The only issue
287 A prime example of this rancor appears in Justice Stevens' Circuit City dissent,
where he asserts that the majority was "[p]laying ostrich to the substantial history" behind
the FAA. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 128 (2001). He suggested
that his fellow Justices ignored legislative history to usurp the lawmaking functions of
Congress:
A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence
unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent with a court's own views of how
things should be, but it may also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was
enacted. That is the sad result in this case.
Id. at 133.
288 Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,25 (1991) (quoting Moses H.
Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); see also supra note
180.
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that has been conclusively decided since Gilmer and Circuit City is the scope of
the FAA's Section 1.289 Meanwhile, important new issues have emerged and
remain unresolved.
Our first conclusion is that federal courts continuously regulate a dispute
resolution process that is inadequately addressed by the FAA and Supreme Court
precedents.
* One-Sided Obligation to Arbitrate Disputes. Ferguson v. Countrywide
Credit Industries, Inc.290 demonstrates that courts increasingly articulate a
bilateral duty to arbitrate disputes. The Ferguson court refused to enforce an
arbitration agreement because it "impose[d] an unfair unilateral obligation on
employees to arbitrate their claims against the employer." 291 The agreement
required individuals to submit a wide variety of employment disputes to
arbitration, 292 but excluded disputes that the employer preferred to litigate. 293
Rejecting this "heads I win, tails you lose" formula, the court concluded:
Although the agreement purports to create a mutual arbitration obligation,
employment disputes likely to be initiated by defendants-such as claims that
an employee defaulted on mortgage loan serviced by defendants, unfairly
competed with defendants or divulged confidential information-need not be
289 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 105.
290 Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industr., Inc., No. CV 00-13096 AHM, 2001 WL
867103 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2001).
291 Id. at * 5.
292 The Agreement required arbitration of:
claims for wages or other compensation due; claims for breach of any contract or
covenant, express or implied; tort claims; claims for discrimination or harassment on
bases which include but are not limited to race, sex, sexual orientation, religion,
national origin, age, marital status, disability or medical condition; claims for
benefits..., and claims for violation of any federal, state or other governmental
constitution, statute, ordinance, regulation, or public policy.
Id., at *4.
293 Under "Claims Not Covered by This Agreement," the contract excluded:
claims for workers' compensation or unemployment compensation benefits; claims
resulting from the default of any obligation of the Company or the Employee under a
Mortgage loan which was granted and/or serviced by the Company; claims for
injunctive and/or other equitable relief for intellectual property violations, unfair
competition and/or the use and/or unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or
confidential information; or claims based upon an employee pension or benefit plan
that either (1) contains an arbitration or other non-judicial resolution procedure, in
which case the provisions of such plan shall apply, or (2) is underwritten by a
commercial insurer which decides claims.
Id.. at *4.
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arbitrated, whereas most claims likely to be initiated by an employee must be
arbitrated. (The arbitration agreement in this case lacks mutuality in this sense
because... [a]n employee terminated for stealing trade secrets, for example,
must arbitrate his or her wrongful termination claim under the agreement while
the employer has no corresponding obligation to arbitrate its trade secrets claim
against the employee.). 294
* Shortened Filing Periods. More courts are policing arbitration agreements
that provide shorter time limits for filing claims than a corresponding law. In
Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America,295 an employee's claim for
reimbursement of medical expenses under a health benefit plan was denied
because the individual did not demand arbitration within sixty days of the plan
administrator's unfavorable decision.296 Thus, the employer attempted to avoid
the arbitration procedure it required its employee to use in place of litigation,
leaving the individual with neither a trial nor private tribunal. The court, noting
that ERISA provides a four-year statute of limitations for an action to recover
benefits under a written contract, ruled that the plan administrator breached its
fiduciary duty by adopting a mandatory arbitration clause that set a sixty-day
time limit in which to demand arbitration.297 The judge further admonished the
employer, stating that
[i]t would have been a simple matter, when the Plan administrator sent a letter to
Chappel notifying him of its denial of his appeal, for the administrator to have
notified Chappel in that same letter of the arbitration clause and its required
procedures. If the administrator had done that, it would have fulfilled its fiduciary
duty to Chappel. 298
* Unilateral Selection of the Arbitrator. The court in Penn v. Ryan's Family
Steakhouses, Inc.299 voided an arbitration agreement because its procedures for
selecting an arbitration panel were judged to be biased and unfair. The ADR
program utilized a panel of three adjudicators-a "respected attorney" who
served as the neutral, a "neutral employee," and "neutral manager. '300 Observing
that the system appeared to be impartial, the court probed further and revealed
that under the employer's procedures, two of these arbitrators were contractually
294 Id., at *5 (citation omitted).
295 Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000).
296 Id. at 723.
297 Id. at 726-27.
298 Id. at 727.
299 Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
300 Id. at 947.
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linked to the arbitration service provider, a firm named EDS. 30 1 In evaluating the
defense of this procedure, the court characterized the arbitration service
provider's
spin on Article IX to really mean that this third list of potential arbitrators is
composed exclusively of EDS-friendly attorneys-attorneys With a huge incentive
to favor EDS in the arbitration hearing in order to secure future employment as a
name placed on this third list of EDS arbitrators." 30 2 Seeing this as a conflict-of-
interest, the court stated that "all three members of the arbitration panel have an
incentive to 'scratch' the back of EDS in the hope that EDS will return the favor in
the future. 303
* Excessive Fee-Shifting to Individual Employees. This has been the most
serious and contentious issue since Gilmer triggered a surge in mandatory
arbitration. The D.C.,30 4 Tenth,30 5 and Eleventh30 6 Circuit Courts of Appeal have
301 Id. The arbitration service provider, EDS, compiled one list of employee arbitrators.
These individuals were also subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement administered by
EDS. A similar procedure was used to generate another arbitrator; only these individuals
were managers who were also signatories to an EDS-administered arbitration agreement.302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), is a leading
decision that articulates a forum substitution theory. A security guard at Union Station in
Washington, D.C. was required to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement that provided cost-
sharing of arbitration forum fees. While the exact amount of the fee was not pre-determined,
the parties stipulated that it would range from $500 to $1000 or more per day. Id. at 1480.
The court agreed with Cole that this cost sharing provision created an unlawful barrier to a
dispute resolution forum. Judge Edwards stated: "Indeed, we are unaware of any situation in
American jurisprudence in which a beneficiary of a federal statute has been required to pay
for the services of the judge assigned to hear her or his case." Id. at 1484. In his view, since
Gilmer stated that "arbitration is supposed to be a reasonable substitute for ajudicial forum,"
Congress could not have intended to require employees to arbitrate employment
discrimination claims and "pay for the services of an arbitrator when they would never be
required to pay for ajudge in court." Id. He enforced the arbitration agreement, but only after
dropping its cost-shifting provision and requiring Bums to pay all forum costs. Id. at 1485-
86.
305 The employer in Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th
Cir. 1999), a janitorial firm, imposed an arbitration on employees that required equal cost-
sharing of forum fees. Id. at 1231-32. After the company sought to compel arbitration of
Shankle's race discrimination claim, the employee was informed by the arbitration service
that he would have to provide a down-payment of one-half of the anticipated $6,000 cost of
arbitration in order to initiate proceedings against the company. Id. at 1232. An indignant
Tenth Circuit denied enforcement to the entire agreement, stating that although a strong
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taken the strongest positions against mandatory cost-shifting provisions, while
the First Circuit 30 7 has taken a contrary tack by continuing to allow cost-shifting
in arbitration agreements. The Third,30 8 Fourth,30 9 Fifth,310 and Seventh311
national policy favors arbitration, Gilmer emphasized:
[A]rbitration of statutory claims works because potential litigants have an adequate
forum in which to resolve their statutory claims and because the broader social
purposes behind the statute are adhered to. This supposition, falls apart, however, if the
terms of an arbitration agreement actually prevent an individual from effectively
vindicating his or her statutory rights.
Id. at 1234 (citation omitted).
306 An airport gate security agent signed a predispute employment arbitration agreement
that had several cost-shifting provisions in Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d
1280, 1281 (11 th Cir. 2001). After Perez filed a sex discrimination lawsuit, Globe moved to
compel arbitration of her claim. The court ruled that Globe imposed unlawful cost barriers to
arbitration in its mandatory agreement. Id. at 1283. The Eleventh Circuit was particularly
critical of the arbitration agreement that Globe forced Perez to sign:
If an employer could rely on the courts to sever an unlawful provision and compel the
employee to arbitrate, the employer would have an incentive to include unlawful
provisions in its arbitration agreements. Such provisions could deter an
unknowledgeable employee from initiating arbitration, even if they would ultimately
not be enforced. It would also add an expensive procedural step to prosecuting a claim;
the employee would have to request a court to declare a provision unlawful and sever it
before initiating arbitration. Including an unlawful provision would cost the employer
little, particularly where, as here, the arbitration agreement provides the employee must
bear the employer's court costs and attorneys' fees incurred defending the agreement if
arbitration is challenged and the employer prevails.
Id. at 1287.
307 In Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
1999), the First Circuit addressed a sex discrimination plaintiffs claim that the arbitral
forum was biased. In this context, the court rejected two arguments that cost was a
prohibitive barrier: (1) arbitrators often refuse to award statutory attorneys' fees, and (2)
arbitration panels often require complainants to pay some or all of the forum fees. The court
said that just because "arbitrators may sometimes do undesirable things in individual cases
does not mean the arbitral system is structurally inadequate." Id. at 15. The court's point was
that NYSE rules do not require arbitrators to order complainants to pay forum fees. Thus, the
cost-sharing aspect of Rosenberg's argument failed because "such outcomes [are not]
necessary concomitants of the NYSE arbitral system." Id. Second, the court reached a
preliminary conclusion "that it does not appear to be the usual situation that a plaintiff is
asked to bear forum fees." Id. Finally, the court stated that "[c]ontrary to Rosenberg's
arguments, arbitration is often far more affordable to plaintiffs and defendants alike than is
pursuing a claim in court." Id. at 16.
308 A female employee sued her employer for alleged sexual harassment in Blair v.
Scott Speciality Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 597 (3d Cir. 2002). She claimed financial inability to
pay for arbitration, but did not present specific evidence to support this assertion. The Third
Circuit rejected her position that "the mere existence of a fee-splitting provision in an
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Circuits have avoided broad policies in preference to fact-specific grounds for
agreement would satisfy the claimant's burden to prove the likelihood of incurring
prohibitive costs ..... Id. at 610. Nevertheless, the court remanded the matter to the district
court for further inquiry into Blair's affidavit of her limited financial capacity. The court
offered this guidance: "Limited discovery into the rates charged by the AAA and the
approximate length of similar arbitration proceedings should adequately establish the costs
of arbitration, and give Blair the opportunity to prove ... that resort to arbitration would
deny her a forum to vindicate her statutory rights." Id.
309 Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 550 (4th Cir. 2001)
adopted a case-by-case approach to determine whether fee-splitting renders an agreement
unenforceable. The court rejected a broad per se rule against all fee-splitting. Id. at 556. The
Fourth Circuit noted that:
[The] appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a particular
case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis
that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees
and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and
whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.
Id.
The court found that Bradford failed to prove he was unable to pay or that he was
deterred from arbitration since he had initiated arbitration before litigation and proceeded
through a full arbitration hearing on the merits of his claim. The court also relied upon
evidence that he earned a salary of $115,000 in addition to yearly bonuses prior to his
discharge. Id. at 558 n.6.
310 A securities broker was fired in Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752,
755 (5th Cir. 1999) after he ranked last in sales and owed his employer $29,613 for advances
on future commissions and a loan for the purchase of a computer. After Williams sued for
age discrimination, the Fifth Circuit ordered him to arbitrate his claim pursuant to NASD
rules and a predispute arbitration agreement he had signed. Williams lost his arbitration
claim and was ordered to repay his former employer, whereupon he sued to vacate this
award. Id. at 755-57. One of his contentions was that the award's order that he pay one-half
of the forum costs (in this case, his share was $3,150) violated public policy. Id. at 764. The
Fifth Circuit dismissed this argument, noting that there was "no evidence that the prospect of
incurring forum fees hampered or discouraged Williams in the prosecution of his claim." Id.
at 765.
311 McCaskill v. SCIMgmt. Corp., 285 F.3d 623, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2002), involving an
employee's Title VII claim against her employer, did not raise the issue of allocation of
direct forum costs. However, it involved the related matter of attorneys' fees. The arbitration
agreement prevented McCaskill from ever recovering her attorneys' fees, even if the
arbitrator ruled in her favor. Id. at 624. This departed from the litigation model in which the
judicial norm is to order employers to pay the attorneys' fees of prevailing Title VII
plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit agreed with McCaskill's contention that such an arrangement
undermined the deterrent function of Title VII: "The right to attorney's fees therefore is
integral to the purposes of the statute and often is central to the ability of persons to seek
redress from violations of Title VII." Id. at 626. Thus, the agreement was held to be
unenforceable. Id. at 627.
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denying enforcement to agreements that shift forum costs to employees.
e Statutory preclusion of predispute arbitration agreements. Although Gilmer
broadly stated a principle against statutory preclusion of mandatory arbitration
agreements, courts have found ways around this principle. This has been
especially true in discrimination cases that rely upon the Civil Rights Act of
1991. The Ninth Circuit held that this law precludes compulsory arbitration of
employee claims. 312 It is important to note, however, that no other appellate court
has joined the Ninth Circuit in this ruling.313
The False Claims Act-federal law protecting employees from retaliatory
discharge when they "blow the whistle" to protect U.S. governmental interests
from fraud or similar harm-has been held to preclude mandatory arbitration.314
This law differs from others by specifying that federal courts have jurisdiction of
these claims,315 and must follow detailed remedial procedures if they find
evidence of whistle-blowing retaliation. 316 However, at least two courts have
made conflicting rulings, finding that the False Claims Act does not expressly
preclude the use of mandatory employment arbitration. 317
* Inconvenient forum. In addition to specifying the arbitral forum, mandatory
agreements increasingly specify the hearing location. Courts are divided on
3 12 See Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1202 (9th Cir. 1998).
313 See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. E.E.O.C., 245 F.3d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir.
2001) ("The Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals to hold that Title VII disputes cannot
be made subject to compulsory arbitration agreements.").
314 See Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(explaining that "given the policies of the FCA, an employee who brings a claim against his
employers as relator on behalf of the federal government should not be forced by unequal
bargaining power to accept a forum demanded as a condition of employment by the very
party on which he informed").
315 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000) (providing that "[a]n employee may bring an action
in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided in this
subsection").
316 See id. stating:
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any
other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or
her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or
others in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation for,
initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this
section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole. Such relief
shall include reinstatement with the same seniority status such employee would have
had but for the discrimination, 2 [sic]times the amount of back pay, interest on the back
pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the
discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
317 See Orcutt v. Kettering Radiologists, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 746, 746 (S.D. Ohio
2002); United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 897 F. Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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agreements that require individuals to travel long distances at considerable
personal expense. 318 Also, at least one situs provision backfired on an employer,
resulting in an arbitration it wanted to avoid.319
* Unavailability of class action relief. Arbitration agreements that deny class
action relief appear to be an increasing subject of litigation, especially when the
substantive claim involves the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). A majority of
courts conclude that this does not impair the rights of employees.320 These courts
rely heavily upon a single sentence in Gilmer's expansive dicta: "[E]ven if the
arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be
granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of
bringing a collective action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation
were intended to be barred."'321 However, since FLSA and the ADEA claims in
Gilmer are fundamentally different,322 this analogy is questionable. One type of
FLSA violation-where employers short-change wages to many employees in
318 Compare Klinedinst v. Tiger Drylac U.S.A., Inc., No. 2001 DNH212, 2001 WL
1561821, at *15 (D.N.H. Nov. 28, 2001) (ordering arbitration where New Hampshire
individual who earned $23,000 annually was compelled to arbitrate claim in San Bernadino
County, California, and where the agreement also required each party to bear own arbitration
expenses), and Poole v. L.S. Holding, Inc., No. 2001-57, 2001 WL 1223748 (D.V.I. Aug.
20, 2001) (rejecting contention by Virgin Islands employee that Massachusetts is a
prohibitively expensive venue to arbitrate claim), with Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No.
145 Lab. Cas. P 34,473, No. Civ. 01-454 (JRTFLN), 2002 WL 100391, at * 1 (D. Minn. Jan.
23, 2002) (holding agreement to compel Minnesota employees to arbitrate claims in
California to be unenforceable).
319 E.g., Becker v. DPC Acquisition Group, No. 00 Civ. 1035 WK, 2001 WL 246385,
at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2001) (holding employment agreement that required arbitration in
New York to be enforceable against Brazilian joint-employer who contended that cost and
lack of contact in jurisdiction should result in transfer of venue).
320 E.g., Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 628, 645-46 (S.D.W.Va. 2001)
("There is no language in the FLSA which expressly prohibits an individual from
contractually waiving his right to assert FLSA claims via a class action mechanism.");
Horenstein v. Mortg. Market, Inc., 9 Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Appellants'
contention that the arbitration clause in the Employment Agreements may not be enforced
because it eliminates their statutory right to a collective action, is insufficient to render an
arbitration clause unenforceable."); Marzek v. Mori Milk & Ice Cream Co., No. 01 C 6561,
2002 WL 226761, *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002) ("[P]laintiff has given no reason for why the
arbitration agreement he signed should not be accorded the same consideration as the
agreement in Gilmer.").
321 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (quoting from a dissenting opinion in Nicholson v. CPC
Int'l., Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., dissenting)).
322 The FLSA specifically provides for class actions "by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (2000).
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amounts too small to matter to individuals 323 -is not comparable to an ADEA
claim because underpayment can be measured in dollars and cents, while
discrimination cannot be quantified so precisely. Perceiving this difference, a
recent court refused to enforce an agreement that bars class relief.324
o Termination for not agreeing to arbitrate a claim. Almost all of the cases in
our sample involved individuals who contested mandatory arbitration agreements
after they signed such an agreement, or after a unilateral policy became effective.
However, in Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., an employer issued a new handbook
that required all employees to arbitrate workplace disputes as a condition of
continued employment. 325 When a group of employees refused to agree to the
new arbitration policy, the company fired them solely for this reason. 326 In suing
to challenge their terminations, the former employees relied upon the EEOC's
policy that prohibits terminations for failure to sign an arbitration agreement. 327
In a case of first impression, the district court found that although the
arbitration provision may have been lawful, the plaintiffs reasonably believed
that the arbitration provision was unenforceable. 328 Thus, the court held that
discharge of the plaintiffs constituted actionable retaliation under Title VII, the
323 See Landaas v. Canister Co., 188 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1951). The court rejected
the employer's argument for application of the maxim, de minimis non curat lex, to
employees' claims for overtime compensation. With individual claims ranging from $21.67
to $256.88 over a three year period, the contested amount of daily underpayment was
extremely small. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded:
The employer gets encouragement from certain words about trivial delays in the portal-
to-portal case discussions. We think there is nothing to this point. It has been said that
the maxim de minimus does not apply to money demands .... The consideration of
plaintiffs' claims does not take the court into the realm of the picayune or
hypertechnical.
Id. at 771.
324 See Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. Civ. 01-545 (JRTFLN), 2002 WL
100391, at * 1 (D.Minn. Jan. 23, 2002) (concluding that "the deprivation of procedural rights
guaranteed by Congress can have a real and detrimental impact on an individual's ability to
effectively vindicate his or her substantive statutory rights"). Id. at *6. Noting that plaintiffs'
ability to pursue class action relief was especially important in this case, the court continued:
"As plaintiffs emphasize, the size of each individual plaintiffs claim for overtime wages is
relatively small. Absent the procedural safeguards guaranteed by Congress, most, if not all,
the plaintiffs will likely forego pursuing their claims." Id.
325 Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1310 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
326 Id.
327 See id. at 1311 (citing E.E.O.C. Notice No. 915.002, Policy Statement on
Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of
Employment (July 10, 1997) (available at 1997 WL 33159163)).
328 Id. at 1311.
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ADA, and ADEA.329 The Eleventh Circuit reversed this ruling, however, by
reasoning that the employees could not have had an objective belief that
predispute employment arbitration agreements are unenforceable.330 Noting that
"[a] Ithough previously disfavored by the courts, arbitration agreements to resolve
disputes between parties have now received near universal approval," 331 the
appellate court concluded:
We see no reason to depart from our own precedent, the mandate of the
Supreme Court, and the holdings of almost every other circuit to find that
compulsory arbitration agreements constitute an unlawful employment practice.
We are not persuaded that the plaintiffs in this case could have "reasonably
believed" that such agreements were an unlawful employment practice at the
time they refused to agree to the policy in 1999.332
This case has important implications for mandatory employment arbitration.
No other case in this study's large sample involved an employer action of this
magnitude. The closest comparison is Desiderio v. National Association of
Securities Dealers.333 Suntrust Bank offered to hire Susan Desiderio on the
condition that she sign a predispute arbitration agreement. 334 When she stated
she would work only if the mandatory arbitration clause was removed, the NASD
informed her prospective employer, Suntrust Bank, that she could not work as a
registered securities broker.335 Suntrust then revoked its offer of employment.336
In Harden the employer went further by ending an established employment
relationship. It is also distinct from cases in which an employer unilaterally
adopted an arbitration policy and made it a contractual term and condition of
employment by inserting it in an employee handbook. In some cases, the
employee signed reluctantly, 337 or the policy was implemented without requiring
individual assent.338 It is also important to note that Harden conflicts with
329 See id. at 1311.
330 Id. at 1315.
331 Id. at 1312.
332 Id. at 1315.
333 Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999).
334 Id. at 200.
335 See id.
336 Id.
337 E.g., Kreimer v. Delta Faucet Co., No. IP99-1507-C-TG, 2000 WL 962817, at *1
(S.D.Ind. June 2, 2000); Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994).
338 E.g., Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 (D.N.M. 2001)
(plaintiff asserted that she never received a copy of the employee handbook, which included
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rulings stating that employees do not knowingly agree to arbitrate employment
discrimination claims when they sign an acknowledgment in an employee
handbook.339
9 Procedural Unconscionability. More courts are examining the conditions
under which employees are compelled to enter into arbitration agreements.
Where employers engage in blatant coercion, such as limiting individuals to
fifteen minutes to read and sign an agreement,340 or requiring Spanish-speaking
workers to sign agreements only written in English,341 courts have denied or
curtailed enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements. Questions have
begun to arise, too, concerning the authenticity of employee signatures on
predispute arbitration agreements. 342
a provision for mandatory arbitration); McClendon v. Sherwin Williams, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d
940, 943 (E.D. Ark. 1999) ("Plaintiff accepted the PRP by choosing to remain an employee
with Sherwin-Williams after having received the employee handbook and by continuing to
stay on the job.").
339 See Kummetz v. Tech Mold, Inc., 152 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1998). The
employer issued an "Information Booklet and an Information Booklet Acknowledgment,"
which the employee signed. Id. at 1154. The acknowledgment declared that: "I understand
and agree that I am covered by and must abide by the contents of this Booklet. I also
understand and agree that this Booklet in no way constitutes an employment contract and
that I remain an at-will employee .... Id. The Booklet also noted that the policies,
practices and benefits set forth in it were subject to change at any time and without prior
notice at the sole and unlimited discretion of the Company. Id. Although the Booklet
contained a mandatory arbitration provision, the employee acknowledgment did not
specifically refer to it. Id.
340 See Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(reporting that when the company's lawyer addressed employees he "used high pressure
tactics to coerce the employees into signing the Agreement," by giving the employees "no
more than fifteen minutes to review a sixteen-page single-spaced document, and never
mention[ing] or suggest[ing] that the employees could review the Agreement at home or
with an attorney").
341 See Prevot v. Phillips, 133 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (S.D.Tex. 2001):
The arbitration agreements were written in English. Plaintiffs testify in sworn affidavits
presented to the Court that they could not read English at the time that they signed the
arbitration agreement. The affidavits also state that the documents were not translated
for them and that they did not know the nature of the agreement into which they were
entering. According to Plaintiffs, their superiors told them not to worry about it and to
quickly sign the documents so they could get back to work.
342 See Prevost v. Burns Intern. Sec. Servs. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 439, 441-42
(S.D.Tex. 2000) (noting that an agreement cannot exist without a valid employee signature;
and seeing preliminary evidence that employee's signature did not match signature on
arbitration agreement, the court ordered hearing to determine validity of employee
signature); and Alcaraz v. Avnet, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 n.2 (D.N.M. 1996)
("Plaintiff claims that he has never seen the original arbitration agreement and ... in the
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* Substantive Unconscionability. An unlikely source, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, decided the leading case on substantive unconscionability.
343
The Hooters court concluded that the employer's rules, which included unilateral
selection of the arbitrator, were "so egregiously unfair as to constitute a complete
default of its contractual obligation to draft arbitration rules and to do so in good
faith," and found that the only possible purpose of these rules was "to undermine
the neutrality of the proceeding." 344 In a stinging rebuke, Judge Wilkinson said:
We hold that the promulgation of so many biased rules--especially the
scheme whereby one party to the proceeding so controls the arbitral panel-
breaches the contract entered into by the parties. The parties agreed to submit
their claims to arbitration-a system whereby disputes are fairly resolved by an
impartial third party. Hooters by contract took on the obligation of establishing
such a system. By creating a sham system unworthy even of the name of
arbitration, Hooters completely failed in performing its contractual duty.
345
A growing number of courts have reached similar conclusions. 34 6
e Timing of Arbitration Hearing. It is no longer an axiom that arbitration
hearings convene sooner and take less time than trials. In one case, an employee
sued to abrogate his duty to arbitrate an employment contract claim, and thereby
pursue his complaint in court, after the arbitration process ran three years without
reaching a conclusion.34 7 The court was sympathetic to his argument but
past, Avnet has forged his signature on a company document; therefore, he is hesitant to
concede to the authenticity of his signature on the Agreement.").
343 See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir.1999).
344 Id. at 938.
345 Id. at 940.
346 E.g., Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 780 (M.D. Tenn. 2002):
[T]he agreement was still drafted by KFC, and imposed on a prospective employee
precisely at the time that he or she is most willing to sign anything just to get ajob.
Although the KFC Arbitration Agreement binds both parties, only the Defendant is
aware of the ramifications of the agreement[.]
See also, e.g., Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
("[T]he EDRP is unreasonably favorable to Bally because ... its terms allow Bally to
unilaterally modify the contract at any time, thus binding employees to a contract they may
never have seen."); Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 985, 999
(S.D.Ind. 2001) (one-sided arbitration agreement with employees holding only a high school
diploma is unconscionable).
347 See Folse v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 56 F.3d 603, 606 (5th Cir.
1995).
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compelled him to continue with the arbitration. 348 Timing can also be
intertwined with other issues. A requirement that a claim be presented at an
arbitration hearing within one year, or forever be time-barred, was held not to be
unconscionable even though the individual contended that a hearing might be
delayed beyond the deadline for reasons outside of her control.349 A case that
took six years and seventy-four hearings to arbitrate raised a different time
issue-an employee's ability to pay her share of very large forum costs. 350
Our second conclusion is that federal courts are mostly inclined to permit
employers to unilaterally impose or require their employees to forgo litigation of
employment disputes, and to refer these matters to arbitration. Nevertheless, we
find surprising evidence ofjudicial resistance to these mandatory arrangements,
even after Circuit City reinforced Gilmer's unambiguous signal to courts to
enforce these agreements. Courts denied enforcement to these contracts in about
thirty percent of all litigated cases since Gilmer, with only slight fluctuation after
Circuit City.
Before these results are misinterpreted by others to mean that courts are
hostile to mandatory employment arbitration, we offer four empirically grounded
conclusions to account for the apparent anomaly revealed in our results.
First, note that this study does more than measure judicial behavior. It also
measures employer conduct in devising and administering mandatory arbitration
procedures. After reading nearly 400 of these decisions, we believe that some
employers in the post-Gilmer period are testing the limits of self-advantage that
can be written into a mandatory arbitration agreement. They do not appear to be
content to have a basic predispute arbitration agreement that substitutes the
arbitral forum for court. Instead, they formulate such self-serving provisions that
the observer would be justified in concluding that the drafter's intent was to
provoke litigation. Examples include requiring employees around the nation to
arbitrate in a particular California county, requiring exorbitant pre-payment of
arbitration services, providing for the employer's unilateral selection of the
arbitrator, or subjecting all employee claims to arbitration but expressly
preserving litigation as an option for all employer claims against employees.
These are matters that neither Gilmer nor Circuit City confronted in concrete
terms or even imagined in a hypothetical scenario. In sum, we believe much
348 Id. (stating "the arbitration of this dispute should have never reached this point in
time .... And, it is more than unfortunate that the arbitration process, designed to resolve
disputes in a timely and cost-efficient manner, has failed the expectations of at least one, if
not both, of the parties" and continuing "[n]onetheless, our directive in this case is clear:
these facts do not permit us to intervene until the parties see this arbitration through to a fimal
award.").
349 See Farac v. Permanente Med. Group, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
350 See LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 2, 8 (D.D.C. 2000).
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higher rates of judicial enforcement would be observed if employers did not
include such red flag provisions in mandatory agreements.
Second, the anomalous post-Gilmer and post-Circuit City figures are partly
attributable to the Ninth Circuit's running battle with the Supreme Court. Courts
in that circuit continue to ascribe vitality to Duffield,351 even when others outside
the circuit recognize that Circuit City effectively repudiated that decision. 352
Adding to this obstinacy, in the brief time since Circuit City stated that the
doctrine of ejusdem generis must be used to construe the FAA's exclusion
section, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that a package delivery driver is just like a
seaman or railroad worker.353 One might say that if an employee uses any
351 See Circuit City Inc. v. Banyasz, No. C-01-3106 WHD, 2001 WL 1218406, at * 3
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2001) ("Duffield remains controlling authority in the Ninth Circuit
despite the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams."); Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. Civ. 01-93 KI, 2001 WL 1105046, at * 3 (D.
Or. Aug. 9, 2001) ("Until the Ninth Circuit makes this determination, and because nothing in
Circuit City addresses the statutory basis for Duffield or its holding, I apply Duffield and the
relevant body of law to this case."); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Undus. Inc., No. CV
00-13096 AHM, 2001 WL 867103, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2001):
The fact that the Circuit City Court quoted with approval language from
Gilmer ... does not alter the analysis; Duffield itself expressly acknowledged and
distinguished Gilmer. Moreover, defendants' emphasis on the fact that the Ninth Circuit
is alone in holding Title VII claims to be immune from compulsory arbitration is
misplaced; this Court is indisputably bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, whether it is
buttressed by other Circuits or not.
But see Farac v. Permanente Med. Group, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
Scott v. Bums Intern. Sec. Services, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137-38 (D. Haw. 2001).
352 See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. E.E.O.C., 245 F.3d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir.
2001) ("The Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals to hold that Title VII disputes cannot
be made subject to compulsory arbitration agreements."); Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291
F.3d 1307, 1315 (11 th Cir. 2002) ("We see no reason to depart from our own precedent, the
mandate of the Supreme Court, and the holdings of almost every other circuit to find that
compulsory arbitration agreements constitute an unlawful employment practice."); Meyer v.
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 8339 (JSR), 2001 WL 396447, at
*1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2001) ("Duffield, if followed here, would preclude
arbitration .... This Court, however, agrees with the courts of the Third and Fifth
Circuits ... who have expressly rejected Duffield and found the OWBPA's requirements to
apply only to waivers of substantive rights under the ADEA .... ); Cooper v. MRM Inv.
Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 775 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) ("[T]he Sixth Circuit has held that the
employees may be required, as a condition of employment, to waive their right to bring
future Title VII claims in court .... Almost every other Circuit to consider this issue has
agreed with the Sixth Circuit." (isolating Duffield in n.2 as the only exception)).
353 See Harden v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc., 249 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001)
("As a delivery driver for RPS, Harden contracted to deliver packages 'throughout the
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mechanical conveyance while at work anywhere in the Ninth Circuit, her
arbitration agreement is excluded under the FAA.
Third, mandatory employment arbitration agreements arouse suspicion in
some judges. In contrast, there is much less controversy over labor arbitration.
This institution grows out of collective bargaining agreements entered into by
labor unions and employers. The Supreme Court praised labor arbitration
unambiguously in the Steelworkers Trilogy.354 Interestingly, this method is
nearly identical to individual employment arbitration, except that it is voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties and is also understood to be limited to matters of
contract application and interpretation. It is therefore much less problematical for
judges. 355
Individual employment arbitration differs on one or both of the following
dimensions: (1) the arbitrator has authority to make an adjudicatory ruling on a
statutory right, as distinguished from a private contractual right, and (2) one of
the disputants imposes this process on the other. Fifty years ago, in a securities
case that presented both of these dimensions, the Supreme Court disapproved the
use of arbitration. 356 Since then, the Court has changed its view, but not without
liberal and conservative Justices expressing serious reservations about the private
adjudication of public rights.357 Mandatory employment arbitration falls in this
United States, with connecting international service.' Thus, he engaged in interstate
commerce that is exempt from the FAA.").
354 See Steelworkers Trilogy, supra note 15.
355 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581 (1960) (noting that the arbitrator "is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by
superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept .... He is rather part of a system
of self-government created by and confined to the parties.") (quoting Harry Shulman,
Reason, Contract, andLaw in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1016 (1995)). In this
vein, "[t]he labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his
knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring
to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria forjudgment." Id. at
582.
356 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). The Court held that a predispute
agreement to arbitrate claims that arise under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 was not
enforceable. Id. Relying upon § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, which declares "void" any
"stipulation" waiving compliance with any "provision" of the Securities Act, the Court
found that an agreement to arbitrate amounted to a stipulation that waived the right to seek a
judicial remedy. Id. at 436, 438. The Court reached a turning point twenty years later when,
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974), the Court took a different
approach in addressing a claim that arose under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 because the provisions of the 1934 Act differs so much from the 1933 Act.
357 See Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("I ... stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling ... Southlanf');
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
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pattern, insofar as it entails involuntary agreements to privately adjudicate
statutory rights. Thus, it is like these other uses of arbitration, where a strong
economic actor steers unwilling individuals away from court. 358 The concerns
dissenting):
[I]n light of today's decision compelling the enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements, it is likely that investors will be inclined, more than ever, to bring
complaints to federal courts that arbitrators were partial or acted in 'manifest disregard'
of the securities laws.... It is thus ironic that the Court's decision, no doubt animated
by its desire to rid the federal courts of these suits, actually may increase litigation
about arbitration.
See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrystler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 647
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
But this is the first time the Court has considered the question whether a standard
arbitration clause referring to claims arising out of or relating to a contract should be
construed to cover statutory claims that have only an indirect relationship to the
contract. In my opinion, neither the Congress that enacted the Arbitration Act in 1925,
nor the many parties who have agreed to such standard clauses, could have anticipated
the Court's answer to that question.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Although
arbitration is a worthy alternative to litigation, today's exercise in judicial revisionism goes
too far."); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 30 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In its zeal to provide arbitration for a party it thinks deserving,
the Court has made an exception to established rules of procedure."); Scherk, 417 U.S. at
529 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The arbitration clause could appear in the fine print of a form
contract, and still be sufficient to preclude recourse to our courts, forcing the defrauded
citizen to arbitration in Paris to vindicate his rights.").
358 Compare Chief Judge Bennett's manifesto in Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 142 F. Supp.
2d 1117, 1117-18 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (citing Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458,462-63
(8th Cir. 2001), involving a mandatory arbitration agreement imposed by a multi-billion
dollar food processor on an individual farmer:
This matter comes before me pursuant to reversal by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals .... In the August 2, 1999, decision, I concluded, inter alia, that Hoffman had
established that the arbitration award was "completely irrational" and that the
arbitration proceedings under the NGFA arbitration rules were not "fiundamentally
fair." Therefore, I denied Cargill's motion to confirm the arbitration award and instead
granted Hoffman's motion to vacate the award. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed my decision and remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration
panel's award favoring Cargill .... I will, of course, unflinchingly follow the mandate
of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case. However, as George Bernard Shaw
once wrote, "All great truths begin as blasphemies." I believe that among the things lost
in the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals are fundamental fairness and
legal principles concerning adhesion contracts in a case involving arbitration between
an individual farmer and one of the largest grain dealers in the world. If anyone thinks
that Mark Hoffman had any possible hope of negotiating the arbitration clause out of
hisboilerplate agreement with Cargill, then that person lives in a world different from
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expressed by Justices of every ideological stripe in these other forms of
mandatory arbitration were reflected in our sample.359 This, in turn, lowered the
enforcement rate of these arbitration agreements.
Finally-and most important-the evidence of judicial resistance we
observed following Gilmer and Circuit City is consistent with court behavior
dating to the nineteenth century, and even earlier. The lessons of our historical
and empirical research are merged: Most courts are neither friends nor foes of
arbitration. Whether they enthusiastically favor it or barely tolerate it, they permit
individuals to enter into contracts that refer their disputes to a private forum, as
long as the process of contract formation and dispute resolution methods are free
of abuses.
Our historical and empirical research have important implications for
moderating the excessively pro-arbitration policy set forth in Gilmer and Circuit
City, and the equally overwrought criticism that these precedents are pernicious.
Gilmer and Circuit City err in concluding that pre-FAA courts were hostile to
arbitration. Of course, the legislative history of the FAA provides textual support
for this view-and here we emphasize that this support is an unconvincing, brief
the one I perceive .... I believe that, at a minimum, arbitration should not be
fundamentally unfair, which I continue to believe it so clearly was in this case. In light
of what is likely to be a rising tide of arbitration of disputes in our society.... there is a
real potential that literally hundreds of thousands of citizens will be deprived of their
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in federal courts by insertion of arbitration
clauses in what are often, in my view, classic adhesion contracts. In these
circumstances, courts should be particularly vigilant not to abdicate their responsibility
to review arbitration proceedings for rationality and fundamental fairness. It is my
fervent hope that the views expressed in my opinion about why fundamental fairness
was so sorely lacking here, while deemed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to be
nearly blasphemous, will someday be recognized for their truth.
359 The District Court in Maine recently said in Snow v. BE & K Constr., Co., 126 F.
Supp. 2d 5, 15 (D. Me. 2001):
Defendant, who crafted the language of the booklet, was trying to "have its cake
and eat it too." Defendant wished to bind its employees to the terms of the booklet,
while carving out an escape route that would enable the company to avoid the terms of
the booklet if it later realized that the booklet's terms no longer served its interests.
A similar theme appears in Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 761 (7th
Cir. 2001): "Above his signature this agreement states that Penn signed it 'knowingly and
voluntarily.' We doubt it could have been 'knowingly' in view of its complexities, or even
'voluntarily.' Had he questioned its meaning and its complexities, it is doubtful that Penn
would have been hired." Finally, we call attention to the tone of this passage from the
Second Circuit in Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271,
276 (E.D. Pa. 1977): "It is thus reasonable to assume that in passing ERISA Congress
intended to protect plan participants from arbitration and similar agreements, often
unilaterally imposed, which 'snip and whittle' at federally granted rights .... .
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passage from a congressional report. Ironically, by failing to conduct their own
inquiry of the history of judicial enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements, pro-arbitration Justices miss a more valuable point: that courts since
the seventeenth century, and authorities such as Blackstone, encouraged
arbitration because of "'the great use of these peaceable and domestic
tribunals. " 360 Our point is that there is much fiction in the idea that Anglo-
American courts were hostile to arbitration. The rationale for promoting
arbitration in Gilmer and Circuit City would be more persuasive if it were
posited in this common law tradition.
But if a more informed historical analysis strengthens the pro-arbitration
rationale in Gilmer and Circuit City, it also provides important evidence to calm
the concerns of ADR critics. The main lesson here is that while courts were not
hostile to arbitration, they were not laissez-faire in sanctioning its use. Nor are
they today in applying the pro-arbitration signal sent in Gilmer and Circuit City.
Again, our historical and empirical results are mutually reinforcing. When
arbitration agreements in the 1840s and 1850s provided one party exclusive
power to name the arbitrator, courts disapproved these one-sided deals.361 The
same is true today.362 An 1870s court broadly upheld the use of predispute
arbitration contracts, but not if they were "induced by fraud, or overreaching, or
entered into unadvisedly through ignorance, folly, or undue pressure .... "363 In
varied circumstances, current courts agree.364 If anything, our research showing
that courts today deny enforcement to a sizeable percentage of contested
arbitration agreements is impressive evidence that the federal judiciary does not
blindly toe the Gilmer and Circuit City line. We conclude by observing that the
direction of judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements is not adequately
360 Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, Carver County, 296 N.W. 475, 486
(1941) (Peterson, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 Blackstone, Bk. 3, pp. 15-17).
361 See Herrick v. Belknap's Estate, 27 Vt. 673, 683-84 (1855) (indicating courts of
equity will intervene when the arbitrator is the appointee of one of the parties); see also
Mansfield & Sandusky City R.R. Co. v. Veeder & Co., 17 Ohio 385, 395-96 (1848).
362 See Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Ind. 2000)
(revoking an arbitration agreement based partly on the fact that the arbitration panel was
biased in favor of one party).
363 Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250, 258 (1872).
364 See e.g., Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940-41 (S.D. Tex.
2001) (declaring an arbitration agreement unconscionable); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips,
173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999) (denying Motion to Compel Arbitration due to
potential for bias resulting from one party's ability to select the entire arbitral panel);
Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999)
(denying Motion to Compel Arbitration on grounds that arbitration agreement failed to
provide accessible forum).
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foretoldby the latest Supreme Court decisions, as commentators often assume.
Rather, this path is more fully revealed in ancient patterns which show that
courts today, in ruling on a growing number of fallout issues from Gilmer and
Circuit City, are turning back to the future.
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